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The increasing complexity, digitalization, integration and automation of the maritime sys-
tems set new cybersecurity requirements for the whole maritime sector. This thesis inves-
tigates the newest cybersecurity publications guiding the industry including releases of
standardization and maritime organizations and classification societies. The goal of the
research is to improve and unify the cybersecurity project execution process of a global
company delivering electrification and automation solutions for the industry.
The research consists of two parts: a literature and industrial practices review and a prac-
tical part aiming at the identification of key areas of focus for the company from which
to begin the unification of their cybersecurity project execution process. The literature
review demonstrates the industry’s ruling approach on cybersecurity: holistic cyber risk
management through each organization level. The review was used as a theoretical frame-
work for the empirical part based on workshops with cybersecurity responsible persons
from different local business units of the company.
This thesis provides a methodology for global process unification, a list of identified im-
provement areas of the current cybersecurity project execution process of the company
and suggestions for improvement. All the list items will be improved, but four key areas
of focus are prioritized: inadequate global infrastructure and standardized cybersecurity
project execution process, training, conflicts between global and local cybersecurity
guidelines and technical solutions and procedures for cybersecurity execution. As a result
of this thesis, the company began enhancing of a global cybersecurity information sharing
platform, complementing training to become globally valid, clarifying conflicts between
global and local guidelines and developing a new cybersecurity execution service solu-
tion.
Overall, this thesis provides the reader with an overview of the current cybersecurity sit-
uation of the maritime industry and helps the preparation for future requirements. This
thesis also presents practical suggestions for the cybersecurity related issues the project
organization of the company is facing. The development processes started during this
thesis will be continued under the group level globalization of security policies.
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Meriteollisuuden järjestelmien kasvava kompleksisuus, digitalisaatio, integraatio ja auto-
maatio asettavat koko meriteollisuudelle uusia kyberturvallisuusvaatimuksia. Tämä työ
tutkii teollisuudenalaa ohjaavia uusimpia kyberturvallisuusjulkaisuja, mukaan lukien eri
standardisointi- ja meriteollisuuden organisaatioiden sekä luokituslaitosten teoksia. Tut-
kimuksen tavoite on parantaa ja yhdenmukaistaa meriteollisuuden sähkö- ja automaatio-
ratkaisuja toimittavan globaalin yrityksen projektiprosessia kyberturvallisuuden näkökul-
masta.
Tutkimus koostuu kahdesta osasta: kirjallisuus- ja teollisuuskäytäntöjen katsauksesta ja
käytännön osasta, joka tähtää niiden avainosa-alueiden identifioimiseen, joista yritys voi
aloittaa projektiprosessinsa parantamisen kyberturvallisuuden osalta. Kirjallisuuskatsaus
demonstroi alan valtaapitävän lähestymistavan kyberturvallisuuteen: kokonaisvaltaisen
kyberriskien hallinnan organisaation joka tasolla. Kirjallisuuskatsausta käytettiin teoreet-
tisena viitekehyksenä työn empiiriseen osaan, joka perustuu yrityksen eri paikallisia lii-
ketoimintayksiköitä edustavien asiantuntijoiden kanssa toteutettuihin työpajoihin.
Tutkimus tarjoaa metodologian prosessin globaaliin yhdentymiseen, listan havaituista
puutteista tämänhetkisessä projektiprosessissa kyberturvallisuuden osalta sekä parannus-
ehdotuksia näihin. Yritys parantaa kaikkia listan kohteita, mutta priorisoi neljä avainosa-
aluetta: puutteet kyberturvallisuuden infrastruktuurissa ja standardoidussa projektiproses-
sissa, koulutus, konfliktit globaalin ja lokaalin ohjeistuksen välillä sekä kyberturvallisuu-
den tekniset ratkaisut ja toimintatavat. Työn tuloksena yritys alkoi parantaa globaalia
alustaa kyberturvallisuuteen liittyvän tiedon jakamiseen, täydentämään koulutustaan glo-
baalisti päteväksi, selventämään globaalin ja lokaalin ohjeistuksen välisiä ristiriitoja ja
kehittämään uutta kyberturvallisuuden palveluratkaisua.
Kokonaisuutena työ tarjoaa lukijalle yleiskatsauksen meriteollisuuden kyberturvallisuu-
den nykytilanteeseen ja auttaa valmistautumaan tulevaisuuden vaatimuksiin. Työ esittää
myös käytännön ehdotuksia kyberturvallisuuteen liittyviin ongelmiin, joita yrityksen pro-
jektiorganisaatio kohtaa. Työn aikana aloitettuja kehitysprosesseja jatketaan linjassa yh-
tymätason turvallisuuspolitiikan globalisoinnin kanssa.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The world of bits, also known as cyberspace, is an inseparable part of today’s world. The
global economy, security of the society, business activities and everyday life increasingly
rely on the successful and safe operations in the cyberspace. Digitalization offers nearly
unlimited opportunities when the geographical and timely boundaries diminish their sig-
nificance. At the same time, the vulnerability grows. When the meaning of bits compared
to physical atoms is growing, the importance of considering the safety of cyberspace is
also increasing. Cybersecurity is not only a technological, but a strategic and political
issue which touches everyone and which everyone for their part is responsible for. The
maritime sector has awakened to this transformation – previously not so cyber reliant
industry  now has  to  adapt  to  the  changes  that  are  inevitably  coming.  (J.  Limnéll  et  al.
2014, p. 13-14)
The increasing complexity, digitalization, integration and automation of systems that the
maritime industry relies on requires holistic cyber risk management onboard. More fre-
quently, different systems are also networked together and connected to the internet,
which grows the cyber risk (The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships 2017, p.
5). Cybersecurity is mandatory not only for the protection of data, but for ensuring safe
and reliable operations (Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Manage-
ment 2016, p. 6). The maritime sector is a vital part of the global economy and must be
protected from the safety, environmental and commercial consequences of poor execution
of cybersecurity. In the worst case, a cyber incident may lead to loss of life, control of the
ship or sensitive data – or the permission of criminality, such as kidnap, theft of cargo or
imposition of ransomware, for example (H. Boyes & R. Isbel 2017, p. 4).
The use of new technologies may provide improved efficiency and safety but also grows
cyber risk. In order to achieve and fully embrace the benefits, cybersecurity needs to be
considered on all levels of the organization and organizations need to establish and follow
a solid cyber strategy. A large part of security breaches is caused by people and poor
processes which means that also personnel, physical and physical aspects related to the
technological maritime systems need to be considered when assessing the cyber risk (H.
Boyes & R. Isbel 2017, p. 12). At its best, by demonstrating best cybersecurity practices,
the organization may develop cybersecurity as competitive advantage to increase its mar-
ket share and to achieve the position of market leader. Cybersecurity provides new busi-
ness opportunities when for example new offerings such as cybersecurity products and
services are released to the market. The maritime industry, despite its slightly slower pace,
is also in the middle of this transformation.
21.1 Background
Increasing requirements regarding cybersecurity during the whole lifecycle of a project
are forcing organizations to evaluate and re-scan their operations on all levels, starting
from the management. To be able to follow the constantly updating standards, rules and
regulations of the industry, anticipation and a look to the future is needed. Some of the
current recommendations and best practices might not be requirements yet, but companies
must be prepared for the transformation from recommendations to rules to happen soon
in the future. To answer this need, a literature review of the newest cybersecurity publi-
cations of the maritime industry setting the future trend is provided in this thesis.
Another challenge organizations are facing is the nature of global business. Wide net-
working is a norm, but geographically widespread business units, customers and other
stakeholders cause challenges when forming and trying to follow common policies and
procedures. The impact of cultural differences and diverse organizational cultures cannot
be forgotten, either. It has also been noticed, that different stakeholders react to cyberse-
curity in a very different way – some of them have recognized the importance of it and
have their own, quite solid and active ways to work, taking into account cybersecurity
related issues diversely while others still have plenty of room for improvement in their
actions.
ABB (Asea Brown Boveri) Marine & Ports business unit, specifically the marine business
area and from now on referred to as ABB Marine, has recognized the need to align and
unify their process and standardize procedures related to cybersecurity during the phases
of  their  projects.  In  an  ideal  situation,  different  local  business  units  would  follow  the
same, common cybersecurity execution and maintenance process for projects. Due to the
local nature and relative independence of different units, this kind of aligning of processes
is a challenge. In order to move towards more global processes, it is required to investi-
gate the already existing process and procedures in different local business units and to
collect together the best cybersecurity practices. With the help of the findings of this in-
vestigation, it is possible to identify the key areas of focus from which to begin the unifi-
cation of processes.
1.2 Research questions and objectives
The research question set for this study is:
∂ How a global company on the marine business, like ABB Marine, can improve its
project execution process incorporating cybersecurity components?
The aim and objective of this study is to improve the cybersecurity project execution
process  of  ABB Marine  in  two ways.  One  goal  is  to  provide  an  overall  picture  of  the
3current cybersecurity trends of the maritime industry and to compare those to ABB Ma-
rine’s operations by identifying any improvement areas in ABB Marine’s cybersecurity
requirements and cybersecurity project execution process. Another, practical goal of the
work aims at global unification of the cybersecurity project execution process of the com-
pany. This process is started by first prioritizing the implementation order of the identified
improvement areas – by identifying the key areas of focus. Thus, the research question
breaks down into the following questions:
∂ What kind of approach to maritime cybersecurity do the latest literature and in-
dustrial practices take?
∂ What kind of best practices are already performed in different local business units
of the company?
∂ Which best practices are worth implementing globally considering the cost benefit
ratio?
The mechanisms used for answering these questions are introduced in the chapter “1.4
Methods and structure of the work” of this thesis.
1.3 Perspective and scope of the study
The research is done from the perspective of a project engineer and it focuses on cyber-
security execution during a project process – it is not desired to dig too deep into the
technical details of the implementation of cybersecurity described in the literature
sources. The study aims to give the reader a general picture of which organizations influ-
ence the development of cybersecurity best practices of ABB Marine and how these ac-
tors approach the topic of cybersecurity. These approaches are introduced in the literature
and industrial practices review.
The reference resources of the literature and industrial practices review section were cho-
sen with the help of experienced employees of ABB Marine. One of the goals was to find
relevant stakeholders that have published anything relatively new, defined during the last
few years, and specifically related to maritime cybersecurity. The fact that not all the
relevant stakeholders have published such releases limits the amount of the literature
sources. For example, it was not considered necessary to include every single existing
classification society’s rules and regulations in the review since they follow the general,
in the beginning of the review introduced international and industry neutral standards.
1.4 Methods and structure of the work
This research was conducted as a qualitative study aiming to understand the current state
of cybersecurity in the maritime industry and to identify the improvement areas in ABB
Marine’s cybersecurity project execution process, policies and procedures. To be able to
answer the research question of this study, a review of current cybersecurity publications
4by relevant sources, including international standards, organizations of maritime industry
and classification societies is completed. Also, a series of workshops with cybersecurity
responsible persons from different local business units is done in order to find out existing
best practices and improvement areas and to collect practical observations.
Theory, which is presented in the literature and industrial practices review, was collected
together and used as a basis for the research and to demonstrate what is already published
about this topic. The literature and industrial practices review serves as a theoretical
framework and also supports the interpretation in the analysis. Inductive reasoning was
used to make conclusions based on the findings from the theory and this new information
was used to complement the procedures of the company – leading to the identification of
key areas of focus for the cybersecurity process unification for projects. As mentioned
above, the literature resources were chosen together with the experienced employees of
the company to ensure the appropriate size of the sample. The amount of sources cannot
be too excessive to ensure a thorough research but it must be comprehensive enough to
cover all the relevant stakeholders of the company. Criteria used when selecting the liter-
ature resources includes:
∂ date of publication – as current as possible, preferably after 2012
∂ connection to maritime industry – as industry specific as possible
∂ relation to ABB Marine & Ports – significant stakeholders or potential future in-
fluencers
∂ geographical coverage – publications from all the operative regions of ABB.
The findings of the literature and industrial practices review are compared to ABB Ma-
rine’s cybersecurity requirements and cybersecurity project execution process in order to
evaluate the compliance and to enable the identification of any improvement areas. Ad-
ditionally, empirical examining of the process and current cybersecurity procedures of
different local business units of the company, as well as analysis of customer needs and
expectations is required. In order to achieve this, the data collection is supplemented with
information gathered through cooperation and discussions with responsible persons of the
project organization from different local business units. These business units are located
in Norway, the Netherlands and Italy. The information gathering is implemented in a form
of workshops. For the first workshop, the writer traveled to ABB Marine & Ports, Nor-
way. The rest of the workshops were implemented via telephone.
The aim of the discussions and especially the visit to ABB Marine & Ports, Norway was
to learn the project execution process from the perspective of cybersecurity and to find
any best practices to share with other business units globally. The contents of the work-
shop in Norway were analyzed with the cybersecurity responsible persons of ABB Marine
& Ports, Finland. The workshop in Norway also provided a chance for open exchange of
ideas between different actors. The outcome of the workshop and its review in Finland
5were complemented with the views of cybersecurity responsible persons from the Neth-
erlands and Italy. As a result and with the help of the summarized information gathered
through actions presented above, the key areas of focus for the beginning of the process
unification can be identified.
The study manages the above mentioned items in the following structure: the first section
introduces the reader to the topic, the motivation and justification of the research, the
research questions and objectives, methods and the research environment of the study, as
well as the concept of cybersecurity specifically related to the maritime industry. The
second section first clarifies the hierarchical governance relations of different organiza-
tions acting in the maritime sector related to cybersecurity and then moves on to review-
ing the cybersecurity documents published by these relevant organizations. In the third
section, methodology for the process unification is first introduced for other companies
to replicate and adapt. After this, the contents of the workshops and the analysis of cus-
tomer needs and expectations are presented. Based on previous findings, the cybersecu-
rity project execution process improvement area detection is done and suggestions for
improvement are stated. Finally, the key areas of focus for the beginning of the process
unification are selected and additional future suggestions are provided. In the last section,
conclusions are presented including the key findings and results of the research, evalua-
tion of the results and potential future research topics.
1.5 Research environment
This research was conducted at the company ABB Marine & Ports Oy for its Marine
business area in Helsinki, Finland. The company is a local business unit of the multina-
tional automation and power technology group ABB’s Industrial Automation division.
Additionally, ABB group has three other divisions: Robotics and Motion, Electrification
Products and Power Grids. Globally, ABB Marine & Ports has 1700 employees in twenty
countries  and  twenty  Marine  Service  Centers  (MSC).  In  total,  ABB  group  employs
around 132 000 people in one hundred countries in three operative regions: Europe, the
Americas and Asia, Middle East and Africa (AMEA). In 2016, ABB group’s revenue was
33 828 million dollars. (ABB 2017a)
ABB Marine & Ports Oy develops electrification and automation solutions for the mari-
time industry and is globally responsible for ABB’s development of the maritime industry
solutions. It provides electric propulsion system, trademarked Azipod®. The Azipod so-
lution can be used in different types of vessels such as ice breakers, cruise ships, yachts
and tankers to improve their fuel economy, energy efficiency and maneuverability. The
savings in fuel consumption are based on the undisturbed water flow in the propellers of
the vessel. In an Azipod propulsion system, the control unit rotates 360 degrees and this
way enables more accurate maneuvering and increases safety. Additionally, the Azipod
system reduces noise production and saves machinery space. The organization of ABB
Marine & Ports Oy consists of three parts – propulsion solutions, electrical solutions and
6digital solutions project organizations. Additionally, a marine service organization which
focuses on the commissioning and maintenance of vessels, exists. (ABB 2017b)
The propulsion solutions organization is specialized in the Azipod propulsion products.
The electrical solutions project organization is in charge of delivering the power genera-
tion and distribution systems for vessels. The automation project organization delivers
integrated marine automation, including the vessel information and control systems, soft-
ware and analytics. Since ABB Marine & Ports Oy is strongly involved in the full lifecy-
cle of the product, beginning from sales, through planning, design and engineering until
the commissioning, maintenance and upgrade, the company is strongly responsible for
successful cybersecurity execution during all the project phases. To ensure this, ABB
Marine & Ports deploys cybersecurity requirements for three areas: product, project and
service. Additionally, requirements for suppliers are presented. This thesis focuses on
cybersecurity from the project execution aspect. Figure 1 illustrates the phases of a typical
project of ABB Marine & Ports and locates the focus of this study.
Figure 1: Phases of a typical ABB Marine & Ports Oy project
The evolution of power and automation requires careful consideration of cybersecurity
from today’s companies, including ABB Marine & Ports. “Modern automation, protec-
tion and control systems are highly specialized information technology systems” (ABB
2016) using commercial off the shelf components and standardized communication pro-
tocols. Additionally, the systems are distributed and highly interconnected, use storage
media and communicate with external systems. This way, the potential attack surface
compared to isolated systems increases. The fact that over 50 % of the ABB offering is
software-related is a clear demonstration of why cybersecurity is seen as an important
issue. Also, compared to “traditional” information technology (IT), power and automa-
tion technology has different characteristics and requirements. While IT aims at protect-
ing information from disclosure or financial loss, the main security objective being con-
fidentiality and privacy, power and automation technology protects physical processes
focusing on safety, health, environment and finance. The main security objectives of
power and automation technology are availability and integrity – the availability require-
ment of the system may be as high as 99,999 %. A notable difference between IT and
7power and automation technology systems is also their lifetime: for IT systems, the sys-
tem lifetime is approximately 3-10 years while power and automation technology systems
may be in use for 5-25 years. (ABB 2016)
ABB Marine & Ports Oy has also recognized proper execution and demonstration of cy-
bersecurity as a way of gaining competitive advantage. Since the maritime industry’s cy-
bersecurity awareness and execution levels are not very developed yet, it is a good time
to act now and aim at the forerunner and market leader position. When the company can
clearly demonstrate its compliance with the newest cybersecurity frameworks, best prac-
tices and standards to its customers, it acts as an effective proof of advanced cybersecurity
maturity of the company. This may also provide new opportunities and customers, espe-
cially when the company can offer new cybersecurity products and services.
1.6 Definition of cybersecurity
This chapter and its subchapters explain the core concepts of cybersecurity to help the
reader understand the more detailed approaches in the following second chapter, literature
and industrial practices review of this thesis. The categorizations, tools and elements pre-
sented in this chapter ease the perceiving of the complete cyber risk management process
and they are mutual for several approaches reviewed in the second chapter of this thesis.
No single, comprehensive definition for cybersecurity exists. Cybersecurity can be con-
sidered as the operations that the organization carries out to protect itself from cyber at-
tacks and their consequences and the necessary countermeasures the organization takes
(M. Lehto & A. Kähkönen 2015, p. 9). According to Lehto and Kähkönen, risk and threat
analysis serves as the foundation of cybersecurity, since the structure and elements of the
organization’s cyber strategy and cyber program rely on these assessed risks and threats.
Development of a cyber strategy and cyber program are primary steps for the organization
in order to holistically consider its cybersecurity. Cybersecurity can also be considered to
base on the identification of the “world of bits”, also known as cyber space, as new oper-
ational domain and environment (Cyber Strategy 2015, Definition of Cybersecurity
2016).
Increasing cybersecurity can be done by lowering the cyber risk. Emphasis on safety re-
lated systems, such as critical infrastructures, is given. A risk-based approach and holistic
risk management is the key for an organization to achieve this goal. Cyber risk manage-
ment can be defined as “the process of identifying, analyzing, assessing, and communi-
cating a cyber-related risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring or mitigating it to an ac-
ceptable level, considering costs and benefits of actions taken to stakeholders” (Guide-
lines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management 2017, p. 5). The implementation of cyberse-
curity begins from the management level and requires commitment on all  the levels of
the organization, since the impact of the human factor on cybersecurity is significant.
Improving cybersecurity requires development of an Information Security Management
8System (ISMS) and continuous improvement processes such as the implementation of
Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle or the Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control
(DMAIC) method of Six Sigma, as the information security standard ISO/IEC
27001:2013 (2013) advises.
1.6.1 Maritime industry specific characteristics and threats
The growth of interconnected control systems is a significant factor for the organizations
of the maritime industry to consider. The information and operational technology systems
of vessels are more increasingly networked not only together but also connected to the
internet. Ship or platform systems, such as propulsion plant and ship control and ballast
and cargo management combined to digital accesses, for example web-based systems and
remote access methods, enable the appearance of new threats such as malware, phishing
and vishing (voice phishing) and poisoned links or attachments (J. Jorgensen 2016, p. 7).
In the maritime industry, third-party access to the marine systems and more generally to
the organization’s important assets and third-party service providers are also common.
These factors add cybersecurity related requirements of the organization and require-
ments are also targeted to the organization’s stakeholders. Safety critical systems are pri-
oritized when assessing and mitigating the cyber risk.
Cyber risk assessment begins with the identification of cyber threats, which can be either
external or internal. The fact that historic evidence is not available and recording of inci-
dents is not required is a challenge of cybersecurity – definitive information about inci-
dents and their impact is absent. However, the organization needs to consider all the as-
pects of their operation that may increase their vulnerability to cyber incidents. Actors
searching these vulnerabilities may be organizations or individuals with different mo-
tives, for example:
∂ activists seeking reputational damage through destruction of data,
∂ criminals chasing financial gain through selling stolen data,
∂ opportunists desiring challenge of getting through cybersecurity defences,
∂ states/state sponsored organizations and terrorists pursuing political gain through
disruption to economies and critical infrastructures (adapted from The Guidelines
on Cyber Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 10).
Additionally, the organization’s personnel may intentionally or unintentionally compro-
mise cyber systems and data. The organization needs to consider the possibility of human
errors when operating and managing the systems of the vessel and the failure of following
the technical and procedural protection measures, as well as employees trying to inten-
tionally damage the organization. (The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships
2017, p. 11)
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geted attacks, the organization or the vessel’s systems and data are the intended target and
in untargeted attacks, they are one of many targets. In Table 1, some of the typical tools
and techniques used under these circumstances are presented (The Guidelines on Cyber
Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 11-12):
Untargeted attacks Targeted attacks
Malware: malicious software to access or
damage a computer without the
knowledge of the owner
Brute force: trying all the possible pass-
words systematically hoping to eventually
find the correct one
Social engineering: a non-technical tech-
nique used to manipulate the organiza-
tion’s personnel to brake a cybersecurity
procedure for example through interaction
in social media
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed
Denial  of  Service  (DDoS):  flooding  the
network with data to prevent the legiti-
mate users from accessing information, in
DDoS multiple servers/computers are
taken under control
Phishing: emails targeted to a large num-
ber of people requesting sensitive or con-
fidential information or a visit to a fake
website
Spear-phishing: emails targeted to a spe-
cific person, often containing malicious
software or links
Water holing: a fake website or compro-
mising an authentic website to exploit vis-
itors
Subverting the supply chain: compromis-
ing software, equipment or supporting ser-
vices necessary to the targeted organiza-
tion/vessel
Scanning: attack randomly targeted to a
large portion of the internet
Table 1: Typical tools and techniques of cyber attacks (The Guidelines on Cyber Secu-
rity Onboard Ships 2017, p. 11-12)
According to DNV GL (Det Norske Veritas, Germanischer Lloyd), there are four possible
responses to a cyber risk or threat: avoid, reduce, accept or transfer. Avoidance means
circumventing the risk “by changing the course of action”. Reducing the risk requires
implementing “corrective actions to reduce the likelihood and/or the severity”. Through
acceptance of a risk, it simply is accepted and a chance of negative impacts is taken.
Transferring the risk means outsourcing of it through sharing it with third parties, which
means for example cyber insurances. (Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resili-
ence Management 2016, p. 29)
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There are several reasons for the importance of the cybersecurity of vessels and the grow-
ing interest in cyber. According to H. Boyes and R. Isbell, a vessel is “a complex cyber-
physical engineered system that encompasses both waterborne activities and systems, and
remote elements such as navigation signals” and it contains five main asset types – “plant
and machinery, operational technology, information technology, radio frequency (RF)
communications and navigation systems” (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017, p. 19). Boyes and
Isbell state, that a loss or compromise of these assets may have impact upon
∂ “the health and safety of staff and other people…
∂ the ability of the ship to operate safely and to not endanger other ships, maritime
structures or the environment; and
∂ the  speed  and  efficiency  at  which  the  ship  can  operate”  (H.  Boyes  & R.  Isbell
2017, p. 19).
With effective cybersecurity execution, these scenarios can be avoided. At its best, oper-
ating on cyber domain may provide the organization with multiple benefits. Lloyd’s Reg-
ister lists some reasons for the increased interest in cyber, including:
∂ “the potential for better business performance”
∂ “the ability to capture and analyze a wide range of data, including operational,
service, monitoring, regulation and off-ship storage data”
∂ “the ability to easily update products based on software…”
∂ “the ability to integrate, flexibility control and optimize systems”
∂ “the potential for better communication both on and off ship (for example, for
data sharing and performing updates and maintenance)” (Cyber-enabled Ships –
Deploying Information and Communications Technology in Shipping 2016, p.
3).
1.6.2 Information and operational technology systems
When considering cybersecurity of a vessel, it is necessary to make a distinction between
information and operational technology systems. According to the Guidelines on Mari-
time Cyber Risk Management by International Maritime Organization (IMO), infor-
mation technology systems concentrate on the use of data as information while opera-
tional technology (OT) systems focus on the use of data to control or monitor physical
processes (2017, p. 4). The protection of information and data exchange between infor-
mation and operational technology systems is also an important factor to be considered.
The development of new technologies causes the fact that IT and OT systems onboard
ships are increasingly networked together and furthermore connected to the internet. The
Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) points out that this connectivity to-
gether with digitalization, integration and automation reliance of systems increases cyber
risks onboard – for example in the form of unauthorized access or malicious attacks to
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ship’s systems and networks. (The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships 2017, p.
5)
Lloyd’s Register’s (LR) Guidance Note “Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information
and Communications Technology in Shipping – Lloyd’s Register’s Approach to Assur-
ance” states that connected systems transform the vessel into a total system of interlinked
systems – “a system of systems” (2016, p. 4). Such vessels can be described with a new
term, “cyber-enabled”. According to LR, cyber systems do not exactly substitute tradi-
tional electro-mechanical systems and operators but enable combining traditional ele-
ments with more complex behavior. At its best, a cyber-enabled vessel can increase its
efficiency and safety through improved monitoring and communication. Using the latest
information and communications technology (ICT), it is also possible to enhance safety,
reliability and business performance, but at the same time the number of risks increases
(Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information and Communications Technology in
Shipping 2016, p. 1). LR suggests that these risks must be identified, understood and
mitigated to ensure safe integration of technologies into ship design and operations.
Adapted from BIMCO’s Guidelines on Cybersecurity Onboard Ships and LR’s Guidance
Note, onboard systems include, but are not limited to:
∂ Bridge & navigation systems: Navigation systems are increasingly digital and
networked with interfaces to shoreside networks. Use of removable media for up-
dating of systems may make bridge systems that are not connected equally vul-
nerable to cyber attacks. Systems in this category are for example electronic chart
display and information systems (ECDIS), global positioning systems (GPS), dy-
namic positioning systems (DPS), global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), au-
tomatic identification systems (AIS), voyage data recorders (VDR) and Radar/Au-
tomatic radar plotting aid (ARPA).
∂ Cargo management systems: Digital cargo management and control systems
may have interfaces to multiple systems ashore. For example shipment-tracking
tools available via internet connection expose data in cargo manifests and cargo
management systems to cyber risks.
∂ Communications systems: Internet connection via satellite and other wireless
communications, including radio communications (broadband, Voice over IP
(VOIP)) potentially increase the vulnerabilities onboard.
∂ Control systems: Digital control and monitoring systems for electro-mechanical
systems, including main engine, generators, ballast tank, life support, fuel and oil
pumps, water tight doors, fire alarms and controls, cargo hold fans, environmental
controls, propulsion and steering of the vessel, are vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Remote condition-based monitoring and diagnostics increase the risk, as well as
integrating these systems to navigation and communications on ships which use
integrated bridge systems.
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∂ Access control systems: Such systems are used for supporting access control in
order to ensure physical security and safety of the vessel and its cargo – including
surveillance, shipboard security alarm and electronic ”personnel-on-board” sys-
tems.
∂ Charterer equipment: Charterers may use equipment, for example sonar and
seismic survey systems, wireless access points, IP ports and wireless phones,
which increase cyber vulnerabilities.
∂ Passenger servicing and management systems, public networks: Valuable
data related to the passengers may be held by digital systems used for property
management, boarding and access control. Intelligent devices, such as tablets and
handheld scanners, can act as attack vectors when the collected data is transmitted
to other systems. Fixed and wireless networks with internet connection, for exam-
ple for guest entertainment use, should be considered uncontrolled and held seg-
regated from safety critical systems of the vessel. Onboard networks used for ad-
ministration of the vessel or the welfare of the crew, as well as software provided
by ship management companies or owners, belong to the same category. (Guide-
lines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 14-15; Cyber-enabled Ships –
Deploying Information and Communications Technology in Shipping 2016, p. 4)
1.6.3 Safety and security
In addition to the distinction between IT and OT systems, cybersecurity can be considered
from two points of view – safety and security. Both cybersecurity and cybersafety have
an effect on the safety of the vessel, not only on the ship itself but the personnel onboard
and the cargo (Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 6). According to the
definition of BIMCO’s Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships (2017, p. 6), cyber-
security concentrates on protecting IT, OT and data from unauthorized access, manipula-
tion and disruption while cybersafety manages the risks from the loss of availability and
integrity of safety critical data and OT.
BIMCO’s Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships (2017, p. 6) introduce several
examples of situations, where cybersafety incidents arise. For example the corruption of
chart data held in an ECDIS is a cybersecurity incident, which affects the availability and
integrity  of  the  OT and  this  way endangers  cybersafety.  Other  examples  presented  by
BIMCO are failures during software maintenance and patching and the loss of or manip-
ulation of sensor data critical for the operation of the vessel. These examples indicate,
that the causes of a cybersafety incidents may be different from those of cybersecurity
incidents and effective cybersafety and cyber risk management with training and aware-
ness of company procedures and policies is necessary in both cases.
The Focus Group on Cybersecurity (CSCG) of The European Committee for Standardi-
zation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
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(CENELEC) deepen the definition of cyber security in its document “Definition of Cy-
bersecurity” (2016) by dividing security to five domains: Operations, Information, Com-
munications, Physical and National Security. By Communications Security, CEN-
CENELEC means the “protection against a threat to the technical infrastructure of a cyber
system” which may make the system incapable of performing its original intended activ-
ities. Physical Security focuses on prevention of physical threats, such as physical access
to a server or insertion of malicious removable media into a network, which influence the
well-being of the system. National Security takes the potential drive for political, military,
or strategic gain of the attacker into consideration. (Definition of Cybersecurity 2016, p.
13)
1.6.4 Confidentiality, integrity and availability model
National Institute of Technology and Standards (NIST) presents a categorization for in-
formation and information system security in its Federal Information Processing Stand-
ards (FIPS) Publication Series, Publication 199 (2004). This categorization is often re-
ferred to as confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) security model and it can be
exploited when assessing the impact of cybersecurity incidents caused by different
sources.
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 names confidentiality,
integrity and availability as the three security objectives for information and information
systems. Confidentiality is defined as “preserving authorized restrictions on information
access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary
information…” (44 U. S. Code, Section 3542). Integrity means “guarding against im-
proper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-
repudiation and authenticity…” while availability is defined as “ensuring timely and re-
liable access to and use of information…” (44 U. S. Code, Section 3542).
BIMCO names three situations in its Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships (2017,
p. 19), where the CIA model can be applied during the assessment of the impact of:
∂ loss of confidentiality – a disclosure of ship, crew, cargo and passenger related
information or data and unauthorized access to these sources
∂ loss of integrity, which can lead to endangering the safe and efficient operation
and administration of the vessel through information and data modification and
destruction
∂ loss  of  availability,  caused  by  the  destruction  of  the  information  or  data  or  the
disruption to services or operations of the systems of the vessel.
The importance of the three factors – confidentiality, integrity and availability – is related
to the type of the system in question, mostly whether it is an IT or OT system. The use of
the information or data varies and so does the relative importance of the factors. BIMCO’s
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Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships (2017, p. 19) mention two examples of the
different division of the importance of these factors. When assessing the vulnerability of
OT systems onboard ships, especially safety critical systems, the priority is to focus on
availability and integrity instead of confidentiality. Even a small loss of data availability
can lead to fatal consequences. On the other hand, when assessing the vulnerability of
commercial operations related IT systems, confidentiality and integrity are in the focus
instead of availability – moderate delays in the availability of data usually cause no risks.
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) add one more ‘A’ to the CIA model in their standard 27000:2014
(2014) – authenticity. According to this confidentiality, integrity, availability and authen-
ticity (CIAA) model, authenticity can be defined as “the property that an entity is what it
claims to be”. As clarified above, the importance of these security properties can be higher
or lower. DNV GL states, that in order to be able to define the levels of importance of
these properties for any safety critical system, evaluation of consequences of a breach of
the property is necessary (Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Manage-
ment 2016, p. 24). Typically, the impact levels are categorized as high, medium and low.
DNV  GL  presents  typical  questions  to  help  assessing  these  consequences  and  the  im-
portance of the property in the following way:
∂ Confidentiality: How important is the fact that this information is and remains
confidential? What are the consequences of disclosing this information?
∂ Integrity: How critically this information needs to be complete and exact? What
are the consequences of this information being wrong or altered?
∂ Availability: What are the consequences of this information/system being una-
vailable for 5 min/30 min/1 hr/1 day?
∂ Authenticity: How important is it to be sure, that the source of information is
who it claims to be? (Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Man-
agement 2016, p. 25)
Additional properties, such as reliability, non-repudiation and accountability, can also be
added to the assessment model, but confidentiality, integrity and availability are the most
commonly handled properties. Table 2 presents the potential impact levels – high, me-
dium  and  low  –  of  the  CIA  model  and  describes  the  nature  of  the  consequences  of  a
security breach on each level:
Impact level Definition Consequences in practice
Low Loss of CIA(A) property:
limited adverse effect on
company, ship, organiza-
tional assets or individuals
A security breach might: i) cause a deg-
radation in ship operation to an extent
and duration that primary functions can
still be performed but their effectiveness
is noticeably reduced; ii) cause minor
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damage to assets; iii) result in minor fi-
nancial loss; or iv) result in minor harm
to individuals.
Medium Loss of CIA(A) property:
substantial adverse effect
on company, ship, organi-
zational assets or individu-
als
A security breach might: i) cause a sig-
nificant degradation in ship operation to
an extent and duration that primary func-
tions can still be performed but their ef-
fectiveness is significantly reduced; ii)
cause significant damage to assets; iii)
result in significant financial loss; or iv)
result in significant harm to individuals,
excluding loss of life or serious life
threatening injuries.
High Loss of CIA(A) property:
severe or catastrophic ad-
verse effect on company,
ship, organizational assets
or individuals
A security breach might: i) cause a se-
vere degradation in or loss of ship oper-
ation to an extent and duration that one
or more primary functions cannot be per-
formed; ii) cause major damage to as-
sets; iii) result in major financial loss; or
iv) cause severe or catastrophic harm to
individuals, including loss of life or seri-
ous life threatening injuries.
Table 2: Impact levels using CIA model (adapted from Guidelines on Cyber Security
Onboard Ships 2017, p. 20)
1.6.5 Human factor
The effect of the human factor on cybersecurity cannot be understated. The human ele-
ment plays a significant role in the majority of cyber security incidents (Recommended
Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Management 2016, p. 8). Due to the high level of
the system connectivity and integration, even small human errors for example by a system
operator may have serious consequences. Cybersecurity awareness and competence
building among the staff is extremely necessary also in order to avoid incidents caused
by for example social engineering or external workers allowed in the facilities, not for-
getting the possibility of insider threat or unintentional errors.
When considering cybersecurity, a holistic approach is mandatory. The onion model is
an effective way to describe the importance of the human factor on cybersecurity. For
example, disabling unnecessary Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports of a laptop may be a
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technical control method to ensure cybersecurity – it reduces the chance of inserting ma-
licious external devices into the laptop. The laptop can be thought to be located in the
center of an open cut onion. The laptop is located in a cabinet, which represents the next
layered shell of the onion. The cabinet is located in a room, which is inside a vessel, which
represent the next layers of the onion. The access from one layer to another is secured –
for example, only authorized people are allowed in the vessel and further on, only author-
ized people may access the room. Finally, only limited amount of people may have the
key to the cabinet. In order to access the USB ports of the laptop, the attacker has to be
able to break through all these controls, which are often highly related to the human fac-
tor. The attacker may for example be let inside the vessel through social engineering,
which is enabled by a human error. On the other hand, in case all the outer layers succeed
in their protection measures, the attacker will never gain access to the laptop. In this case,
the disabling of unnecessary USB ports only has a nominal meaning. This scenario re-
flects the importance of planning cybersecurity as a totality, beginning from the highest
level.
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2. LITERATURE AND INDUSTRIAL PRACTICES
REVIEW
In this section, the latest cybersecurity related publications of the selected reference
sources are reviewed. Each chapter provides the reader with an overview of the nature of
the respective publication, with its most important characteristics and individual approach
to the topic of cybersecurity. In the beginning of the section, the levels of governance
targeted to ABB Marine & Ports and especially the role of classification societies is ex-
plained. After this, each reference is introduced one by one, beginning from the industry
neutral ones, entering into maritime industry specific publications and the approaches of
classification societies. At the end of this section, potential future influencers’ aspects are
presented and finally, a summary of the section is provided.
2.1 Levels of governance
As a maritime and shipbuilding industry system supplier, it is required from ABB Marine
& Ports to fill multiple requirements coming from different actors and different levels.
The levels and typical actors are described in Figure 2. The hierarchy of the actors is
directive only in order to provide the reader with a preliminary image of the relations
between different actors – in reality, such strict notations cannot be made since these
actors work in close cooperation. Both non-governmental and government dependent and
international governmental organizations align requirements that ABB needs to meet. The
rules and regulations can be set by international standardization organizations or they may
be coming from national level, for example. In addition, classification societies of ship-
building and maritime industry and private sector companies add their own standards to
the collection.
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Figure 2: Different actors setting requirements for ABB Marine & Ports
Classification societies, which are non-governmental organizations objectively evaluat-
ing vessels, have a close influence on the work at ABB Marine & Ports. They can also
work for the state under whose flag the vessel is registered, which connects them to the
national level. Some classification societies also cooperate with private sector companies
and do research in order to improve their rules and better prepare for the future innova-
tions of maritime industry. Classification societies set out rules and requirements on the
safety and security of the vessels based on technical standards. The construction and the
operation of the vessel must demonstrate compliance with these standards in order to pass
the survey of the classification society. This is why ABB Marine & Ports must follow the
regulations of classification societies very strictly. Without an approval of a classification
society, a vessel is not allowed to sail and it most likely will not earn an insurance either.
Despite giving their approval, classification societies take no responsibility of the condi-
tions, such as the safety or seaworthiness of the vessel during its operation.
Typically, the customer which is also called the owner, purchases a turnkey shipbuilding
project from the selected shipyard. In order to deliver the project and to construct the
vessel, the shipyard orders different types of products and work from subcontractors.
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ABB Marine & Ports works as one of these subcontractors by delivering for example the
propulsion system, power plant and automation of the vessel to be constructed. The owner
has the authority to choose the inspecting classification society. This way, the owner’s
decision affects both the work of the shipyard and ABB Marine & Ports when they have
to comply with the requirements of the classification society.
2.2 Industry neutral publications
In this chapter, generic industry neutral standards related to cybersecurity are presented.
It is noticeable, how they link with each other. The standards in this chapter often take a
high-level approach to the concepts of safety and security. Commonly referenced and
relevant standards, which the majority of the following frameworks and guides in the
literature and industrial practices base on, are produced by the IEC and ISO. Other indus-
try wide recognized frameworks have been published by the previously as the Information
Systems Audit and Control Association known organization ISACA, the Information Se-
curity Forum ISF and the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST.
2.2.1 ISO/IEC standards
The ISO/IEC 27000 (2016), also known as the Information Security Management Sys-
tems (ISMS) family of information security standards was developed by the sub-commit-
tee 27 of the first Joint Technical Committee (JTC1) formed by ISO and IEC and consists
of fifteen parts. The collection of standards is growing and it focuses on providing guid-
ance on best practices of information security management. The central concept of the
ISMS family of standards is an Information Security Management System which is a part
of the overall management system of the organization and managing risks through infor-
mation security controls. According to the ISO definition, an ISMS is “based on a busi-
ness risk approach, to establish, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain and im-
prove information security” in the context of the organization, and “a holistic approach
to managing information security – confidentiality, integrity and availability of infor-
mation and data” (A. Terroza 2015, p. 5). ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (2013) specifies the re-
quirements for such ISMS but is not a technical standard describing the technical details
of such system. In addition to information technology, the standard concentrates on im-
portant business assets such as resources and processes of the organization. (A. Terroza
2015, p. 8)
Organizations seeking conformance to ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (2013) must meet require-
ments presented in the form of the following Clauses:
∂ Clause 4: Context of the organization
∂ Clause 5: Leadership
∂ Clause 6: Planning
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∂ Clause 7: Support
∂ Clause 8: Operation
∂ Clause 9: Performance evaluation
∂ Clause 10: Improvement. (ISO/IEC 27001:2013)
The standard also provides a list of fourteen reference control objectives and controls
which help the implementation of information security best practices and which are “de-
rived from and aligned with those listed in ISO/IEC 27002:2013” (2013). For example,
the objective of “A.5.1 Management direction for information security” is: “To provide
management direction and support for information security in accordance with business
requirements and relevant laws and regulations” (ISO/IEC 27001:2013, p. 16). To
achieve this, for example definition of policies for information security should be com-
pleted and they should be approved by the management, published and furthermore com-
municated to employees and relevant external parties. (ISO/IEC 27001:2013, p. 16)
Another IT security techniques standard published by the JTC1 of ISO and IEC is the
ISO/IEC 15408 (2008 & 2009) “Information technology – Security techniques – Evalua-
tion criteria for IT security” or “Common Criteria” (CC) which consists of three parts and
presents a general evaluation model for computer security certification. Other commonly
recognized cybersecurity related and relevant standards are IEC 62443 (2016) and IEC
61508 (2010) series of standards. IEC 62443 provides guidance on Industrial Automation
and Control Systems (IACS) security while IEC 61508 concentrates on the “functional
safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems” (IEC
61508 2010). The list of cybersecurity related standards presented in this chapter is not
exhaustive, but, in the scope of this thesis, sufficient.
2.2.2 COBIT Framework and ISF Standard of Good Practice for
Information Security
In 2012, ISACA published a holistic information governance and management frame-
work, COBIT 5, to answer the organizations’ needs of keeping risks on an acceptable
level, maintaining availability to systems and services and complying with relevant laws
and regulations. There is also an online version of COBIT 5, which is mainly available
free of charge. COBIT 5 presents five principles and seven enablers, which allow organ-
izations to create optimal value of information technology. The principles of COBIT 5
are meeting stakeholder needs, covering the enterprise end-to-end, applying a single in-
tegrated framework, enabling a holistic approach and separating governance from man-
agement. The enablers that COBIT 5 lists are:
∂ principles, policies and frameworks,
∂ processes,
∂ organizational structures,
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∂ culture, ethics and behavior,
∂ information,
∂ services, infrastructure and applications and
∂ people, skills and competencies. (ISACA 2012)
In 2016, Information Security Forum (ISF) published “The Standard of Good Practice for
Information Security 2016” (the Standard) which fully covers the topics of previously
introduced ISO/IEC 27002:2013 and COBIT 5, as well as the following NIST Frame-
work. The topics introduced in the Standard include threat intelligence, cyber attack pro-
tection, industrial control systems (ICS), information risk assessment, security architec-
ture and enterprise mobility management. The Standard states to help organizations meet
regulatory and compliance requirements, respond to rapidly evolving threats – even so-
phisticated cyber attacks – and be agile and exploit new opportunities. The Standard pre-
sents threat intelligence for increasing cyber resilience and guides how information risks
can be managed to an acceptable level. The Standard, however, is available free of charge
only for the ISF Members. (Information Security Forum 2016)
2.2.3 National Institute of Standards and Technology Frame-
work
NIST, a measurement standards laboratory and an agency acting under United States De-
partment of Commerce, has noted the importance of cybersecurity related to critical in-
frastructures and produced already widespread guide, “Framework for Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity” (2017). The guide is currently published as a Draft Version
1.1 and NIST collects feedback and comments, intending to publish a final version around
the fall of 2017. It is likely to become an influential benchmark for any organization for
assessing their cybersecurity (L. Shen 2014, p. 2).
The NIST Framework defines critical infrastructures as “systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic secu-
rity, national public health or safety, or any combination of matters”, which acts as a
decent definition for any other state as well. The Framework, being flexible and technol-
ogy-neutral,  is intended to complement the organization’s risk management process and
cybersecurity program by providing classification and mechanisms for organizations to
answer questions regarding:
∂ the description of their current cybersecurity posture
∂ the description of their target state for cybersecurity
∂ the identification and prioritization of opportunities for improvement, following a
continuous and repeatable process
∂ assessing progress towards the target state
22
∂ communication of cybersecurity risk among internal and external stakeholders.
(Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 2017, p.8)
The Framework takes a risk-based approach to cybersecurity and consists of three parts:
the Framework Core, Profiles and Tiers. The Core presents various cybersecurity related
activities and outcomes that can be found in a cybersecurity program and which are or-
ganized to five main Functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover. These
functions are divided to Categories and Subcategories which reference to industry-ac-
cepted standards and guidelines, Informative References such as ISO, for more specific
guidance on how to implement a specific activity or outcome.
For example, when the organization wants to view its protection against cyber threats, it
can look at the Protect Function, which is divided to six Categories:
∂ Access Control
∂ Awareness and Training
∂ Data Security
∂ Information Protection Processes and Procedures
∂ Maintenance
∂ Protective Technology.
These Categories are further divided to multiple Subcategories of cybersecurity activities,
for example the Access Control Category has six Subcategories, first of them being “Iden-
tities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked and audited for authorized
devices, users and processes” (Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyberse-
curity 2017, p. 36). This Subcategory is then linked to multiple Informative References
including publications of for example the International Society of Automation (ISA) and
ISO/IEC.
The Profiles present the outcomes based on business needs that the organization has se-
lected from the Categories and Subcategories. The aim is to align the Functions, Catego-
ries and Subcategories with the requirements, risk tolerance and resources of the organi-
zation. The Profiles provide a summary of the organization’s cybersecurity activities and
enables self-assessment when creating a Current Profile and a Target Profile. The Current
Profile represents the current state of the organization’s cybersecurity program and the
Target Profile reflects the goal or target state that the organization desires to achieve.
Once both of these Profiles are identified, the organization can identify any gaps between
those two and create a roadmap for areas that need strengthening in order for the organi-
zation to achieve its target state. To ensure flexibility of implementation, there is no tem-
plate for creating Profiles presented in the Framework. (L. Shen 2014, p. 2)
The third component of the Framework, the Implementation Tiers, provides the descrip-
tion of the level to which the organization’s cybersecurity risk management practices
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show the characteristics defined in the Framework. Organization’s practices can be char-
acterized over a four-stage range from Partial to Adaptive, Partial representing the lowest
level which means that the organization does not follow formalized practices and has little
awareness of cybersecurity risk and Adaptive meaning that the organization is capable of
adaptive, lessons learned based and predictive cybersecurity management. Once the or-
ganization has identified their Tier stage, they can decide whether they should consider
moving to a higher stage by investing additional resources, which is encouraged when
this move is considered cost effective and improves cybersecurity. (Framework for Im-
proving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 2017, p. 13)
NIST presents four ways in which the Framework can be used – reviewing of cybersecu-
rity practices, establishing or improving a cybersecurity program, communicating cyber-
security requirements with stakeholders and identification of new or revised Informative
References. The current cybersecurity activities of the organization can be compared to
the outcomes defined in the Core to find out which areas may need to get improved. The
Framework also demonstrates steps to follow in order to create a new or improve the
current cybersecurity program. Since the Framework defines a common language for
communicating cybersecurity requirements, it can be used when communicating with im-
portant stakeholders. Finally, the list of Informative References included in the Frame-
work may help organizations to find opportunities to revision or creation of new standards
or guidelines. (L. Shen 2014, p. 3)
2.3 International maritime industry specific publications
In this chapter, reference sources specifically connected to the maritime sector are intro-
duced. The publications reviewed in this section are released by the European Union
Agency for Network and Information Security, International Maritime Organization, Bal-
tic and International Maritime Council and the Government of the United Kingdom.
2.3.1 European Union Agency for Network and Information Se-
curity
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) published
the first ever European Union (EU) report on cybersecurity challenges of the maritime
sector: “Analysis of Cyber Security Aspects in the Maritime Sector” (2011). The analysis
first points out that the maritime sector is critical for the European society. For example
in 2010, 52 % of the goods traffic was carried out by maritime transport while a decade
ago this number was only 45 %. ENISA identifies, that the growing ICT reliance of mar-
itime operations also grows the cyber threat menace and the need to ensure the dependa-
bility and ICT robustness against cyber attacks is a key challenge. The document focuses
on presenting key insights and high-level recommendations of this area, with a touch on
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the policy context at the European level. (Analysis of Cyber Security Aspects in the Mar-
itime Sector 2011, p. 6)
The first observation that ENISA introduces is the fact that the awareness level on cyber-
security in the maritime factor is low to non-existent. One of the reasons for this may be
that not a lot of cybersecurity incidents within this sector create sufficient media exposure
nor are there mechanisms in the Member States of EU to identify and report these inci-
dents specifically within the maritime sector. ENISA recommends the Member States to
implement awareness raising campaigns, especially to promote cybersecurity training.
The target audience would be all the relevant stakeholders of the maritime sector, for
example ship crews and port authorities, and the provision could be coordinated by cy-
bersecurity officers such as national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) and
cybersecurity offices. (Analysis of Cyber Security Aspects in the Maritime Sector 2011,
p. 13)
ENISA notes, that the use of specific technologies, ICT complexity and the growing con-
nectivity of the maritime systems causes challenges to ensure security provisions. It
would benefit all the stakeholders to commit to a common strategy and development of
good practices, aiming to ensuring security by design for all the ICT components of the
maritime sector. Also cybersecurity aspects should be added to the maritime regulations
and policies since they currently only consider the physical aspects of safety and security.
In order to achieve this, a holistic risk-based approach with the use of proactive cyber and
information security risk management principles is mandatory. (Analysis of Cyber Secu-
rity Aspects in the Maritime Sector 2011, p. 7)
At last, ENISA’s analysis manages the fragmentation of maritime governance context –
it is divided between for example international, national and European levels. ENISA
suggests that IMO, European Commission and the Member States should aim to harmo-
nize and align international and European policies of this sector. Different roles and re-
sponsibilities at various levels should be specified by the Member States. Also the coor-
dination and cooperation between all the stakeholders, such as CERTs and port authori-
ties, should be defined with the help of public-private sector interaction. Improved infor-
mation exchange would also potentially help insurers to develop their actuarial models,
reduce risks and provide better insurance contracts to the stakeholders. (Analysis of Cyber
Security Aspects in the Maritime Sector 2011, p. 7)
At the end of ENISA’s analysis, suggested next steps are presented:
∂ Short-term: stimulating dialogue and information exchange between maritime
and connected stakeholders, raising cybersecurity awareness, developing strate-
gies and good practices defining ICT security requirements
∂ Mid-term: developing cybersecurity trainings, defining roles and responsibilities
related to cybersecurity at the European and national levels, taking a risk-based
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approach towards cybersecurity and adding considerations towards cybersecurity
in maritime sector governing frameworks
∂ Long-term: developing standards and setting regulations in order to achieve cy-
bersecurity, developing information sharing and analysis centres at national and
European level, aligning and harmonizing international and European policies,
adding cybersecurity aspect to existing regulatory frameworks. (adapted from
Analysis of Cyber Security Aspects in the Maritime Sector 2011, p. 24-25)
2.3.2 International Maritime Organization
IMO published the “Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management” in July 2017
which were approved at IMO’s Facilitation Committee’s forty-first session in April 2017
and at its Maritime Safety Committee’s ninety-eighth session in June 2017. The Guide-
lines are meant to provide high-level recommendations and functional elements which
can be incorporated into existing risk management processes for effective maritime cyber
risk management. According to IMO, risk management is fundamental in order to safe-
guard shipping from current and emerging threats and vulnerabilities caused by “digiti-
zation, integration and automation of processes and systems in shipping” – and it is not
enough to focus on operations in the physical domain. (Guidelines on Maritime Cyber
Risk Management 2017, p. 3)
The Guidelines remind, that while new technologies and ICT systems provide efficiency,
at the same time they also add risks to critical systems and processes. The Guidelines
define a threat as “presented by malicious actions (e.g. hacking or introduction of mal-
ware) or the unintended consequences benign actions (e.g. software maintenance or user
permissions)”. These actions can expose or exploit a vulnerability in OT or IT which can
result from for example imperfect design or integration of systems or shortages in cyber-
discipline. The safety and security impacts caused by the exposure or exploitation of vul-
nerabilities in IT systems must also be considered in effective cyber risk management.
(Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management 2017, p. 4)
According to the Guidelines, rapidly changing technologies make it difficult to address
the risk simply through technical standards. Instead, the risk management approach
should be resilient and evolving as an extension of already existing safety and security
management practices. Multiple control options for cyber risk management, including
management, operational, procedural and technical controls, must be considered when
weighing potential threats, vulnerabilities and risk mitigation strategies. Effective cyber
risk management begins from the management level and the culture of cyber risk aware-
ness needs to get achieved at all levels. This enables holistic, continuous operation and
evaluation through effective feedback. (Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management
2017, p. 4-5)
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The Guidelines present a simple goal of maritime cyber risk management: “to support
safe and secure shipping, which is operationally resilient to cyber risks”. This can be
achieved by assessing the organization’s current and desired cyber risk postures. Once
this is done, gaps can be identified and addressed to achieve the risk management objec-
tives. This requires a prioritized cyber risk management plan. In order to help the organ-
ization reach this goal,  the Guidelines present five functional elements,  noting that the
elements are not sequential but continuous and concurrent, supporting effective cyber risk
management:
∂ “Identify”: definition of personnel roles and responsibilities, identification of po-
tentially ship operation risk-posing systems, assets, data and capabilities
∂ “Protect”: implementation of risk control processes and measures, contingency
planning against cyber attacks
∂ “Detect”: development and implementation of activities to detect cyber events in
a timely manner
∂ “Respond”: development and implementation of activities and plans for resili-
ence and restoring of systems disordered by cyber events
∂ “Recover”: identification of measures to back-up and restore cyber systems af-
fected by cyber events. (Adapted from Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Man-
agement 2017, p. 5)
At the end of the Guidelines, several best practices for implementation of cyber risk man-
agement are referenced. According to IMO, they are “The Guidelines on Cyber Security
Onboard Ships” (2017) by BIMCO, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (2013) standard and the NIST
Framework (2017).
2.3.3 Baltic and International Maritime Council
BIMCO has published “The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships” (2017) which
are aligned with the Guidelines on Cyber Risk Management (2017) by IMO. BIMCO also
mentions that the Framework by NIST was used while developing the Guidelines.  Ac-
cording to BIMCO’s Guidelines, although the cyber security approaches are company-
and ship-specific, they should be guided by “appropriate standards and the requirements
of relevant national regulations” (Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships 2017, p.
5). Another aspect which BIMCO highlights in its Guidelines is that the cyber risk man-
agement plans and procedures of the organization should be complementary to the exist-
ing safety and security risk management requirements presented in other systems and
codes in use, such as the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships
and Pollution Prevention (ISM Code), the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (ISPS Code) and the Safety Management System (SMS).
Figure 3 represents the cyber security approach of BIMCO’s Guidelines on Cyber Secu-
rity Onboard Ships (2017, p. 8). The six core concepts of effective cyber risk management
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are identification of threats, identification of vulnerabilities, assessing risk exposure, de-
velopment of protection and detection measures, establishment of contingency plans and
responding to and recovering from cybersecurity incidents. (The Guidelines on Cyber
Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 8)
Figure 3: Cyber security approach of the Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships
(BIMCO 2017, p. 8)
The topics of identification of threats and vulnerabilities were managed in the chapter
“1.6.1 Maritime industry specific characteristics and threats” of this thesis. As the first
recommendation under the subject of assessing risk exposure, BIMCO’s Guidelines sug-
gest the accountability and ownership for the assessment to start from the senior manage-
ment level of the organization, for multiple reasons including the following:
∂ Senior management level must evaluate and decide on risk versus trade-offs as
their strategic responsibility, since improving cybersecurity may make standard
business processes more time consuming or costly.
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∂ Improving cybersecurity may be related to business processes and training rather
than to IT systems and for this reason must be handled organizationally.
∂ Senior management level must decide whether or how to amend relationships with
customers, suppliers and authorities, in case improving cybersecurity requires
new kind of cooperation between parties.
∂ When the previous three aspects are clear, it is possible to define the IT require-
ments of the cyber strategy, which can be done by the IT department.
∂ The general strategic decisions and risk versus trade-offs guide the development
of contingency plans of potential occurring cyber incidents. (Adapted from Guide-
lines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 17)
The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships (2017) remind to take the range of the
characteristics of the maritime industry into consideration while assessing the risk. These
characteristics were presented in the chapter “1.6.1 Maritime industry specific character-
istics and threats” of this thesis. In the chapter “1.6.4 Confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability model”, the CIA model which the Guidelines suggest to be used for the impact
assessment, was also introduced. The Guidelines present two approaches for risk assess-
ment - organization’s own and third-party assessments. According to the guidelines, the
risk assessment process made by the organization should begin by assessing the onboard
systems, the goal being mapping their robustness to manage the cyber threats on the cur-
rent level. The Guidelines suggest to first identify the existing technical and procedural
controls protecting IT and OT systems, IT and OT systems that are vulnerable and the
specific vulnerabilities, cyber attack vulnerable key ship board operations and the possi-
ble cyber incidents and their impact on key ship board operations including the likelihood
of their occurrence. The organization can cooperate with the service providers and the
producers of the onboard equipment and systems in order to find out about already exist-
ing technical controls and procedures related to cybersecurity. (The Guidelines on Cyber
Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 22)
Third-party risk assessments serve as good completions for self-assessments and may
help identifying gaps and risks that were not found during the assessment made by the
organization. In order to find out whether the organization’s defence level matches the
one set out in the organization’s cyber strategy, penetration tests of IT and OT systems
can be made. However, active penetration testing such as social engineering or physical
penetration to the facility’s security perimeter may only be suitable for IT systems, since
OT systems may be so vital that risks related to them cannot be taken. In these cases,
passive testing, such as scanning data transmitted by the system, should be considered.
The Guidelines introduces a four-phase risk assessment process, which results in a final
report including executive summary, technical findings, prioritized list of actions, sup-
plementary data and appendices. Once the findings are handled, it may be necessary to
send a subset of findings to the producers of the affected systems and to use some external
expert analysis. (The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 24)
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The fifth part, developing protection and detection measures, of BIMCO’s Guidelines
states that the goal and outcome of the cyber strategy should be reduction of risk, if
needed. Situations, where it has not been controlled who has had access to the onboard
systems, such as drydocking, need special attention. Cyber security protection measures
may be technical or procedural, but both technical and procedural controls should be
compatible with the CIA model. Only cost effective technical controls should be imple-
mented and the implementation should be prioritized, beginning from those with the
greatest benefit. The Guidelines refer to the list of Critical Security Controls (CSC) by
The Centre for Internet Security (CIS) and has collected together the most relevant ones
to ship onboard equipment and data:
∂ “limitation to and control of network ports, protocols and services
∂ configuration of network devices such as firewalls, routers and switches
∂ physical security
∂ detection, blocking and alerts
∂ satellite and radio communication
∂ wireless access control
∂ malware detection
∂ secure configuration for hardware and software
∂ email and web browser protection
∂ data recovery capability
∂ application software security (patch management)
∂ training and awareness
∂ access for visitors
∂ upgrades and software maintenance
∂ anti-virus and anti-malware tool updates
∂ remote access
∂ use of administrator privileges
∂ physical and removable media controls
∂ equipment disposal, including data destruction
∂ obtaining support from ashore and contingency plans” (The Guidelines on Cyber
Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 25-34).
In the last parts of the Guidelines, establishment of contingency plans and responding to
and recovering from cybersecurity incidents, it is highlighted that it is important to un-
derstand the significance of each cyber incident specifically for IT and OT systems. The
CIA model should be used to assess the impact of incidents. Especially loss of OT systems
should be taken seriously since it typically immediately affects the safe operation of the
ship. The Guidelines remind, that contingency plans for cyber incidents should be ad-
dressed by appropriate operational and emergency procedures included in the SMS. Some
of the existing procedures in the SMS may also already cover some cyber incidents. The
30
SMS typically includes “procedures for reporting accidents or hazardous situations and
levels of communication and authority for decision making” (The Guidelines on Cyber
Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 35). These procedures can be amended to suit the situa-
tions of cyber incidents. The contingency plans should be available in a non-electronic
form in case of an incident with data destruction, for example. External expert assistance
may be required when handling especially complex or severe incidents.
At the end of the Guidelines, BIMCO suggests information of previous identified cyber
incidents to be used when improving the response plan. To achieve an effective response
to a cyber incident, a team of “onboard and shore-based personnel and/or external ex-
perts” should be built for restoring the IT and OT systems enabling the normal operation
of the vessel. The Guidelines present a four-step list for effective response:
∂ “Initial assessment”: Answering questions related to how the incident occurred,
which systems were affected and how, the extent to which data is affected and to
what threats to systems remain
∂ “Recover systems and data”:  Cleaning,  recovery  and  restoring  of  IT  and  OT
systems and data in order to return to operational conditions, removing threats and
restoring software
∂ “Investigate the incident”: Investigation (with external experts) to understand
the causes and consequences of the incident – vital role in preventing recurrences
∂ “Prevent a re-occurrence”: With the help of the investigation outcome, potential
supplement of protection measures. (Adapted from Guidelines on Cyber Security
Onboard Ships 2017, p. 37)
According to the Guidelines of BIMCO, the purpose of a recovery plan is “to support the
recovery of systems and data necessary to restore IT and OT to an operational state”. The
focus is on ensuring the safety of the onboard personnel by prioritizing the operation and
navigation of the vessel. The recovery plan should be available in hard copy both onboard
and ashore and cybersecurity responsible personnel should be able to understand it. In
case recovery of OT requires assistance from ashore, it should be clarified in the recovery
plan. After recovery, proper investigation of the cyber incident can provide valuable in-
formation for both the organization and the maritime industry in a wider context. External
expert support may be needed, but the information gained from proper investigation can
be used in many helpful ways – for example to improve the technical and procedural
protection measures to prevent recurrences, understand potential cyber risks of maritime
industry better and identify lessons learned and improve training to raise awareness level.
(Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships 2017, p. 39)
2.3.4 Government of the United Kingdom
The Government of the United Kingdom (UK) published a “Code of Practice – Cyber
Security for Ships” (H. Boyes & R. Isbell), referred to as the “Code”, in September 2017.
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The document is produced by the Institution of Engineering and Technology, supported
by the Defence Science and Technological Laboratory and funded by the Department for
Transport. After explaining the definition of cybersecurity and the importance of it for
vessels, it focuses on providing a management framework with the target of reducing the
cyber risk.
The Code’s risk management approach to cybersecurity begins with the development of
a cyber security assessment (CSA), which acts as a base of the cyber security plan (CSP).
On a higher level, the ship security assessment (SSA) and the ship security plan (SSP),
which are required by the ISPS code align the development of the CSA and CSP. Based
on all these documents, the policies, processes and procedures of the vessel are produced.
With the performance of a CSA, the organization is able to assess and mitigate the risks
caused by potential threats relevant to vessels and prioritize these risks. This way, appro-
priate investments to improve the security controls to mitigate the risks with the highest
impact can be done. When assessing the risks, four aspects and their relationships must
be considered – physical, personnel, processes and technical. (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017,
p. 21-23)
The Code’s CSA process begins with the identification of the important vessel assets such
as data, systems and functions, to protect. In the next phase, the vessel’s operational pro-
cesses are identified and their criticality is assessed. It is also required to understand the
dependencies between them. In the third phase, the risks arising from potential threats,
vulnerabilities and their likelihood of occurrence are assessed. This needs to be done “in
order to establish the need for and to prioritise security measures”. The fourth phase is
the “identification, assessment, selection and prioritisation of security controls and pro-
cedural changes”. In this phase, their costs and savings and impact on risk reduction and
ship operation need to be considered. In the last phase of the CSA process, the accepta-
bility of the overall residual risk is continuously reviewed based on the selected security
controls. (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017, p. 22)
According to the Code, the CSP which is built based on the CSA and the existing SSP,
should establish “appropriate security measures designed to minimize the likelihood of a
breach of security and the consequences of a potential risk” (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017,
p. 23). The completed CSP should be an annex of the SSP and protected from unauthor-
ized access. A holistic approach is mandatory and from the cybersecurity point of view,
the CSP should either refer to or contain:
∂ “the policies that set out the security-related business ruled derived from the SSP;
∂ the processes that are derived from the security policies and provide guidance on
their consistent implementation throughout the lifecycle and use of the ship assets;
and
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∂ the procedures that comprise the detailed work instructions relating to repeatable
and consistent mechanisms for the implementation and operational delivery of the
processes” (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017, p. 23).
The Code reminds, that a big part of security breaches is caused by people and poor pro-
cesses and therefore recommends a careful consideration of personnel, process and phys-
ical aspects that relate to technological systems protected with cybersecurity measures.
Appropriate measures must be implemented for the previously mentioned aspects as well
and they also depend on the targeted cyber resiliency level. The Code highlights the im-
portance of training and assessment of the personnel that have the authority to access the
systems of the vessel. (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017, p. 23)
The CSP should be at least annually reviewed and based on any identified gaps, “short-
comings or … changes … which impact on the ship or ship assets”, updated accordingly.
The CSP should also present the monitoring and auditing measures for the full lifecycle
of all the assets of the vessel and only “suitably qualified and experienced” actors should
complete this work. The Code states, that the monitoring should continue also in the case
of failure or interruption of any system. In addition to self-assessment, The Code recom-
mends assessing “the compliance of the vessel’s supply chain with the security policies,
processes and procedures” of the CSP. Although some responsibility of the compliance
can be transferred to a supplier, the company owning the vessel should be accountable of
the overall security controls. (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017, p. 24-25)
In the last section of the Code, “Managing cyber security”, management and operational
arrangements are handled. Those arrangements include the identification of the cyberse-
curity responsible individual(s) of the vessel, “the establishment of a security operations
center (SOC)”, “the arrangements for providing information to third parties” and “the
arrangements for managing security incidents or breaches”. The Code recommends a des-
ignation of a cyber security officer, CySO, which should be in charge of all security as-
pects of cyber systems on the vessel and aware of legal and regulatory changes that could
potentially affect the vessel’s policies, processes and procedures. Additionally, the CySO
should cooperate with the Company security officer (CSO), ensure “the development,
periodic review and maintenance of the CSA/CSP” and be responsible for the implemen-
tation and exercising of the previously mentioned. Cybersecurity specialists’ advice may
be used when CySO’s knowledge of the topic and appropriate solutions is imperfect.
CySO’s cybersecurity responsibility may also be shared “with other managers and service
providers”, but the CySO remains accountable. (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017, p. 27-28)
Finally, the Code recommends establishing a security operations center (SOC). A SOC is
a central unit handling security issues related to the cyber-physical systems of the vessel.
In case of a cybersecurity related event or unfolding circumstances, the main functions of
a SOC are to observe any type of threats to the vessel, orient through risk analysis
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“whether proactive measures are required to reduce the risk to an acceptable level”, de-
cide the appropriate actions and act by implementing these decisions. A SOC personnel
may need to access “threat intelligence information from both public and private sector
sources” in order to better be aware of the general threat environment. As an example of
this kind of threat intelligence sharing scheme the Code mentions the Cyber Security In-
formation Sharing Partnership (CiSP), which is a joint industry and government initiative
launched in 2013 and operated by the National Cyber Security Center of the United King-
dom. The Code lists several benefits of participating in an information sharing scheme
like this – for example early warning of cyber threats and the chance to learn from expe-
riences of other users and seek help. (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017, p. 29-30)
2.4 Classification societies
In this chapter, the cybersecurity approaches of selected classification societies are intro-
duced. The publications of this chapter are released by Lloyd’s Register, DNV GL and
American Bureau of Shipping.
2.4.1 Lloyd’s Register
Lloyd’s Register’s approach “Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information and Com-
munications Technology in Shipping” (2016) to assuring the safety and security of to-
day’s cyber-enabled vessel begins with the definition of a cyber system and the term
cyber-enabled, which were handled in the chapter “1.6.2 Information and operational
technology systems” of this thesis. The publication, referred to as the “Guidance Note”,
lists  six key areas of risk to be considered and addressed when assuring the safety and
dependability of a cyber-enabled vessel: system, human-system, software, network and
communications, data assurance and cybersecurity. LR recommends a risk-based assur-
ance process and references ISO/IEC standards as well as its own LR Rules for govern-
ance and guidance of ICT requirements. The Guidance Note is followed by the “Cyber-
enabled Ships - ShipRight Procedures - Autonomous Ships – Guidance Document”
(2016) which should be read in conjunction with the Guidance Note. The ShipRight Pro-
cedures dig deeper and provide tools for addressing the requirements for detailed system
design. (Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information and Communications Technology
in Shipping 2016, p. 1; ShipRight Procedures – Autonomous Ships 2016, p. 1)
According to LR’s Guidance Note, the assurance of the cyber-enabled vessel begins by
the identification of safety critical systems and ensuring their resiliency and graceful deg-
radation in case of failure. In order to do this, “the fault tolerance and the defence control
and monitoring functions needed for the services and systems critical to safety or the
business need to be identified” (Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information and Com-
munications Technology in Shipping 2016, p. 4). A risk-based approach, such as LR’s
own “Assessment of Risk Based Design” (ARBD) process or for example the NIST
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Framework can be used. The Guidance Note also reminds, that the remote connection to
systems on shore create an extra level of complexity and risk and additional questions,
such as “are the onshore systems maintained, patched and protected to an acceptable
standard?” must be answered when assessing the risk.
LR’s Guidance Note states, that the assisting or replacing of seafarers or tasks that operate
the vessel which ICT enables potentially offers benefits, but in order to achieve this the
vessel’s design must address the human-system issues emerging from the use of ICT. A
successful design considers the changed expectations targeted to the users for operation
and failure diagnose of the systems, re-design of the work of seafarers and off-shore staff,
the impact of changes on safe and efficient performance of the staff and the need to mon-
itor ship operations. The Guidance Note suggests a structured, human-based approach to
be used and references the ISO 9241-210 Human-Centred Design (HCD) for Interactive
Systems standard (2010). (Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information and Communi-
cations Technology in Shipping 2016, p. 7)
When considering networks and communications, LR’s Guidance Note notes, that the
suppliers are expected to provide safe and secure systems, but often these systems have
not been tested as part of the complete system in the environment they are intended to be
used. For this reason, it needs to be ensured that the network components are of correct
maritime environment standard and enough spares for critical infrastructures are available
on board, the communications bearer and maintenance are functional especially if sys-
tems are supported from on shore, the internal networks offer sufficient data capacity, the
safety and business critical systems can be prioritized by the staff when necessary and the
data transfer is fast enough to operate the ship safely and securely without compromising
data integrity. (Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information and Communications
Technology in Shipping 2016, p. 8)
LR’s Guidance Note highlights the increasing importance of software (SW) maintenance
because of the high level of SW integration and reliance on correctly operating SW. The
production and maintenance should fill the requirements of a recognized international or
national standard, such as IEC 61508:2010 (2010) “Functional Safety of Electrical/Elec-
tronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems”. According to the Guidance
Note, a good engineering process considers the complexity of SW including its failure
mechanisms and general third-party provided components, as well as defines the docu-
mentation needed for producing the SW, communicating the “requirements, design, op-
eration, constraints, limitations and maintenance to the software product’s stakeholders”.
(Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information and Communications Technology in
Shipping 2016, p. 8)
In LR’s risk-based approach to SW assurance, the goal is to manage the general risk
caused by the characteristics of the SW and the specific risks related to a certain SW
application. LR’s “Provisional Rules and Regulations for Software to be used in Naval
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Ships” (2016) are referenced to offer detailed guidance related to the topic. According to
the Guidance Note, it is the producer’s responsibility to “demonstrate that the practices it
uses are suitable and adequate” and the degree of oversight of the production of SW is
evaluated based on specific criteria, for example the maturity of the producing organiza-
tion. Additionally, the SW production must be delivered in accordance with the ISO
9001:2015 (2015) standard for quality management. What it comes to SW maintenance,
the Guidance Note brings up the importance of proper SW configuration management,
since due to the high level of integration of systems, any changes made to individual
systems may raise  the  risk  of  failure  of  the  overall  system.  Again,  ISO 9001 and  ISO
10007:2017 (2017) standard for configuration management are referenced to help with
the implementation of suitable SW configuration processes. (Cyber-enabled Ships – De-
ploying Information and Communications Technology in Shipping 2016, p. 9)
In the end of the Guidance Note, LR points out that although data is extremely vital to
any organization, at lot of organizations are not able to handle their data effectively – they
might not know what data they hold, what they need or the quality of the data. The or-
ganizations need to follow a criteria for data assurance at the system design: “integrity,
availability, authentication, confidentiality, authorization, non-repudiation” and safety-
preserving data properties. The Guidance Note also highlights the need to secure critical
maritime systems from the increased cyber threats, especially because the global econ-
omy is increasingly dependent on maritime trade. According to LR, cybersecurity is a
“through-life issue” beginning from project inception to asset disposal, referring to
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (2013) and ISO/IEC 15408 (2008 & 2009) standards. The role of
education and related organizational culture is significant when considering cybersecu-
rity. Finally, LR states that connectivity is the element making the marine environment
unique for cyber incidents. Also, the fact that vessels often have 64 Kb Inmarsat connec-
tion between systems rather than a 50 or over Mb broadband causes the fact that any files
needed for recovery in the event of cyber attack need to be located onboard instead of
being downloaded, since downloading would take an unbearably long time. Nevertheless,
most vessels do not have for example operating system disks onboard which serves as a
single point of failure and vulnerability. (Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information
and Communications Technology in Shipping 2016, p. 10-11)
2.4.2 DNV GL
DNV GL’s “Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Management for Ships
and Mobile Offshore Units in Operation” (2016), referred to as the “Recommended Prac-
tice”, begins with quotations from the ISM Code and IMO Guidelines on Maritime Cyber
Risk Management (2017). In addition to these publications, the Recommended Practice
is built on BIMCO’s Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships (2017). In the begin-
ning of the Recommended Practice, DNV GL presents the categorization of threats with
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examples. These were introduced in the chapter 1.6.1 “Maritime industry specific char-
acteristics and threats”. After this, the Recommended Practice lists three factors for im-
proving cybersecurity:
∂ “assessment”
∂ “improvement”
∂ “verification and validation” (Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience
Management 2016, p. 8).
According to DNV GL’s Recommended Practice, there are multiple common aspects in
cybersecurity resilience with quality management systems. The Plan-Do-Check-Act
(PDCA) cycle, concept of continuous improvement of processes and compliance with the
ISM and ISPS Codes are relevant. In the beginning of the document, DNV GL also men-
tions ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (2013) and IEC 62443-3-3:2013 (2013) as requirement plac-
ing standards. (Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Management 2016,
p. 8)
DNV GL’s Recommended Practice recommends three different approaches for assess-
ment – high level, focused and comprehensive, in-depth assessment. The high-level as-
sessment is categorized as senior management’s responsibility while focused assessment
is done for specific systems and data sets and comprehensive assessment for generation
of a comprehensive image of the total cybersecurity risk of the organization. The four
steps of the high-level assessment are:
∂ identification of key systems of the company
∂ consideration  of  the  consequences  of  a  cyber  attack  (with  the  help  of  the  CIA
model and impact assessment presented in the chapter 1.6.2 “Confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability model” of this thesis)
∂ assessing the likelihood of a cyber attack
∂ displaying the results of the previous two steps in a risk matrix. (Adapted from
Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Management 2016, p. 14)
After the high-level assessment, the organization has an overview of its cybersecurity risk
picture and with the help of these results, it can begin focusing on where more detailed
assessment is needed. Focused assessment is recommended for systems and datasets
which “are placed in the unacceptable part of the risk matrix”. The four steps of the fo-
cused assessment are:
∂ identification of threats to systems, that support specific vessel functions and busi-
ness processes
∂ identification of barriers preventing incidents related to these threats
∂ identification of barriers reducing the consequences, in case these incidents occur
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∂ assessing the robustness of these preventive and consequence reduction barriers.
(Adapted from Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Management
2016, p. 15)
Barrier in cybersecurity can be an “action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces
the threat, vulnerability or an attack by eliminating it, or preventing it, by minimizing the
harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective actions can be
taken”. DNV GL suggests the Bow-Tie method to be used during focused assessment.
The Bow-Tie method helps the quick visualization of whether more cybersecurity
measures should be implemented, since it does not focus on the probability or frequency
of the attack – instead it assesses the risks, controls and barriers against certain attack.
Bow-Tie diagrams are also an effective way to build awareness of cybersecurity efforts
and with them, the Core Functions defined in the NIST Framework can be found. The
main components of the Bow-Tie method are “hazard, top event, threats, consequences
and barriers”. The Recommended Practice provides various lists of questions, actions and
categorizations to help the identification of necessary components to complete the fo-
cused assessment. (Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Management
2016, p. 18-21)
The comprehensive, in depth assessment is more technical and may require external ex-
pert assistance to be completed. It is used when a more detailed assessment is needed and
is related to the critical business processes. The five steps of the comprehensive, in depth
assessment are
∂ identification  of  the  critical  IT/OT systems (by  mapping  them to  business  pro-
cesses)
∂ identification of the consequences of a cyber attack for each system (with the help
of the CIA model and impact assessment presented in the chapter 1.6.2 “Confi-
dentiality, integrity and availability model” of this thesis)
∂ determination of the ease of access to each of these systems
∂ rating of the systems regarding their cybersecurity risk (likelihood X the conse-
quences of the attack)
∂ comparison of current safeguards with the target level. (Adapted from Recom-
mended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Management 2016, p. 21)
The Recommended Practice provides various lists of questions, actions and categoriza-
tions to help identification of necessary components to complete the comprehensive, in
depth assessment as well as the focused assessment. After briefing the use of CIA model,
the Recommended Practice gives an example of the determination of the likelihood of an
attack and the construction of a risk matrix. When combining the results of these actions,
the systems can be rated regarding their cybersecurity risk and comparing of current safe-
guards with target can be done. For IT systems, the Recommended Practice and its Ap-
pendix E provide practical guidance on how to build “more detailed checklists referencing
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the technical prioritized verifiable control points” based on the requirements of the “BSI
Grundschutz catalogue” (2013), which is aligned with ISO/IEC 27001 (2013). For OT
systems, the Recommended Practice and its Appendix F provide guidance on how to build
checklists based on the requirements of IEC 6443-3-3 (2013). (Adapted from Recom-
mended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Management 2016, p. 22-28)
The assessments introduced in the previous sections help the organization find its areas
of improvement. In the “improvement” section of DNV GL’s Recommended Practice,
mitigation options for risks are first introduced. These responses were presented in the
chapter 1.6 “Definition of cybersecurity in maritime industry” of this thesis. The Recom-
mended Practice states, that a cost benefit analysis is mandatory when defining the most
efficient risk mitigation strategy. This requires viewing the cybersecurity risk picture of
the organization – it can be used to build financial models to support investment decision
making for improvement actions. Previously presented Bow-Tie method and cyber risk
matrix are proposed to be used as tools. When reducing the risk is desired, respective
checklists and a work plan based on these is proposed. Because the risk picture constantly
changes, it is required to use continuous improvement cycles, such as the PDCA to ensure
that the checklists and procedures remain up to date. Through continuous improvement,
the organization’s cybersecurity maturity and resilience level can grow from reactive to
predictive and finally, proactive. (Recommended Practice – Cyber Security Resilience
Management 2016, p. 29-30)
DNV GL’s Recommended Practice states, that the improvements can concern general
awareness and training, be of more technical nature or relate to creating an ISMS. The
Recommended Practice highlights the meaning of the human factor in cybersecurity – for
example social engineering and phishing are common. Insider threat must also be consid-
ered. It is very important to build awareness and competence, since staff in many organ-
izations is unable to react correctly in case of a cybersecurity incident. “The desired be-
haviour and awareness … needs to be evaluated just like any other objective”. As tech-
nical improvements in the maritime and offshore industries, the Recommended Practice
mentions for example network segregation and hardening secure remote connections. The
Recommended Practice also states that it may be valuable for the organization to establish
an ISMS based on the IEC/ISO 27001 (2013) standard, which can be integrated to the
organization’s integrated management system. While the Recommended Practice focuses
on the operational aspects of cybersecurity management, IEC/ISO 27001 standard com-
plements it with organizational point of view. The Recommended Practice provides a list
of Clauses of IEC/ISO 27001 which it covers, which it does not cover and guidance on
how to achieve full cover of the standard and an effective ISMS. (Recommended Practice
– Cyber Security Resilience Management 2016, p. 31-35)
The final section of DNV GL’s Recommended Practice presents approaches for valida-
tion and verification after the assessment and improvement actions have been completed.
First, monitoring and testing of technical barriers is introduced. This can be divided to
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testing of components and testing of systems. In both cases, testing on a recurring basis
is recommended. For component level testing, the guidance of IEC 62443-4-2 (2017) and
IEC 61162-460:2015 (2015) standards is referred to. After component level testing, the
system can be tested in different ways – by actively provoking failures or periodically
repeated passive measurements and by penetration tests. The topics were also presented
in the chapter 2.3.3 “Baltic and International Maritime Council” of this thesis. When test-
ing, “verification by an accredited third party can add value”, especially when validating
the ISMS as a whole. The certification received from the worldwide recognized third
party may also drive the continuous improvement cycle of cybersecurity. (Recommended
Practice – Cyber Security Resilience Management 2016, p. 36-38)
2.4.3 American Bureau of Shipping
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) released the industry’s first risk-based management
program, ABS “CyberSafety™” series, which presents best practices for safety and secu-
rity of four key cyber areas of marine and offshore environments: “cybersecurity, auto-
mated systems safety, data management and software assurance” (Cybersecurity – Guid-
ance Notes for the Marine and Offshore Industries 2016, p. 2). The program is described
as “measurable implementation of CyberSafety that tailors cybersecurity and systematic
safety to assets in order to enable and encourage risk-based asset management as a sys-
tematic  outcome”  (J.  Jorgensen  2016,  p.  9).  The  program  consists  of  a  family  of  five
documents:
∂ “Volume 1: Guidance Notes on the Application of Cybersecurity Principles to
Marine and Offshore Operations” (referred to as “Volume 1”)
∂ “Volume 2: Guide for Cybersecurity Implementation for the Marine and Offshore
Industries” (referred to as “Volume 2”)
∂ “Volume 3: Guidance Notes on Data Integrity for Marine and Offshore Opera-
tions”
∂ “Volume 4: Guide for Software Systems Verification”
∂ “Volume 5: Guidance Notes on Software Provider Conformity Program”.
This thesis focuses on introducing the first two volumes of the series to give the reader a
good overview of the program, since the three last documents of the series concentrate on
providing detailed technical direction for the implementation of thorough cybersecurity.
Volume 1 of ABS CyberSafety™ series first explains how growing software and auto-
mation dependence and integration of systems of the maritime industry makes proper
cybersecurity and software integrity management increasingly important in order to
widely understand the linked systems, software and overall system safety. The Cyber-
Safety™ program answers these needs by presenting a Capability model which helps the
organization add cybersecurity to its OT systems and to the linked business systems. A
Capability has a wide definition, since it includes “people, systems, data and processes”.
40
The idea of the program is to gradually build these capabilities “based on security needs,
staff competencies, available acquisition resources and organizational maturity in cyber-
security”. (CyberSafety™ – Volume 1 2016, p. 10)
The Capability model of ABS CyberSafety™ Volume 1 presents three sets of capabilities:
Basic Capabilities, Developed Capabilities and Integrated Capabilities – a total of 37 ca-
pabilities, which serve as the primary elements of the organization’s cybersecurity pro-
gram and their implementation can be prioritized in a measurable way. Appendix A pre-
sents the full capability model, in which the first nine capabilities form the Basic Capa-
bility Set, capabilities from ten to 23 present the Developed Capability Set and the final
capabilities from 24 to 37 build the Integrated Capability Set.
In the next parts of the ABS CyberSafety™ Volume 1 document, Best Practices for each
of the Capability are introduced. The Best Practices are constructed based on multiple
sources, including different industries, government reports and white papers. For each
Capability Best Practices, a list of references is provided for further understanding. For
example, one of the Best Practices for the first capability of the Basic Capability Set,
“Exercise Best Practices”, is presented as follows: “The organization uses regional and
national resources (e.g., US-CERT, ICS-CERT and ENISA) to gain access to recent vul-
nerability and threat information relevant to its assets” (CyberSafety™ – Volume 1 2016,
p. 15). In the end of the chapter, the reference list includes links to relevant references,
including all the mentioned organizations that were mentioned in the Best Practice.
The Volume 2 of the ABS CyberSafety™ program follows the Volume 1 by providing
implementation specifications for the capabilities and linking systems engineering and
cybersecurity. The goal is to build a Capability-Task-Assessment cycle and develop a risk
profile for the assets and collections of assets. Volume 2 “provides criteria for the assess-
ment of corporate systems and asset readiness to prevent cyber events that my compro-
mise the safety and security of the data, systems and assets”. In the Volume 2, an optional
“CS” series (CS1, CS2 and CS3) Class Notation is offered. It may help the organization
to indicate its preparedness for cybersecurity concerns. The categorization is based on the
requirements presented in the document and is suitable for all vessels compliant with the
ISM Code. An organization compliant with the procedures and criteria defined in Volume
2 may receive a CyberSafety Management System Certificate (CMSC) and Notation CS1,
CS2 or CS3 (in case of an ABS classed vessel, otherwise a “Statement of Fact”) or a
Certificate of Cyber Compliance (CCC) for an examined facility. (J. Jorgensen 2016, p.
11; CyberSafety™ – Volume 2 2016, p. 2-7)
Figure 4 presents the Notation hierarchy of ABS CyberSafety™ Volume 2. The levels of
Notation build on the implemented Capabilities. This means, that increasing the capabil-
ity implementation is the way for the organization to move up to the higher Notation level.
The CS Notation level also describes the organization’s level of cybersecurity maturity.
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The CS Notation levels are linked to the respective sets of Capabilities presented in Vol-
ume 1 of the program. When implementing the Basic Capability Set, the organization can
reach the CS1 level, by the Developed Capability set the CS2 level can be reached and
by the Integrated Capability Set, the highest C3 level can be achieved. (CyberSafety™ –
Volume 2 2016, p. 22)
Figure 4: ABS CyberSafety™ - Notation hierarchy (CyberSafety™ – Volume 2 2016,
p. 22)
Following the explanation of the Notation hierarchy, Volume 2 provides a more detailed
description of the requirements of each level, as well as an overview of the capability
assessment process. The main focus of the document is in the Capability Matrix, which
establishes the Best Practices and defines and provides “the organizational process spec-
ification for each capability together with the associated IT and OT specifications” (Cy-
berSafety™ – Volume 2 2016, p. 30). Appendix B presents an example of how the first
capability, “Exercise best practices”, of the Basic Capability Set is displayed in the Ca-
pability Matrix and the specifications and requirements related to this capability.
At the end of Volume 2, it is stated that if the organization desires to achieve the ABS
CyberSafety™ certification, it needs to establish a Cybersecurity Management System
(CMS) in order “to implement and monitor its security strategy and plan”. The CMS is
the framework for capability and tracking management as well as the key for the organi-
zation to grow its capabilities to desired levels, to support “operational understanding of
security posture(s); satisfying audit requirements; and provisioning and maintaining se-
curity continuous monitoring (SCM) needs” (CyberSafety™ - Volume 2 2016, p. 104).
Volume 2 presents a list of requirements set for the CMS to be able to demonstrate, plan,
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implement and operate such system. In the last chapter of the document, requirements for
the maintenance of the classification with the ABS CyberSafety™ Notation are presented.
(CyberSafety™ - Volume 2 2016, p. 114)
2.5 Potential future influencers
In this chapter, publications that may have future influence on the actions of ABB are
processed. The material of this chapter is produced by Bureau Veritas and United States
Coast Guard.
2.5.1 Bureau Veritas
In 2016, Bureau Veritas (BV) published “Cybersecurity of Connected Vehicles Guide-
lines”, from now on referred to as the “Guidelines”. The Guidelines present a set of cy-
bersecurity objectives and best practices for manufacturers and supplies for securing their
vehicles against cyber threats, concentrating on the automotive industry. However, the
publication was found interesting for the research of this marine industry focused thesis
since the appearance of autonomous vessels is in the near future for this industry as well.
(Cybersecurity of Connected Vehicles 2016, p. 6)
In the beginning of the Guidelines, BV brings up the fact that the embedding of new
features which are exposed to cyber attacks may affect the vehicles confidentiality, integ-
rity and availability properties. In case of a successful cyber attack, the vehicle’s internal
data may get intercepted, the vehicle fleet can be immobilized or the vehicle may become
controlled, modified or even stolen remotely by the attacker. BV mentions that the lack
of common public cybersecurity standard for vehicles prevents manufacturers and sup-
pliers from sharing references and this is why each of them has created their own strategy.
This causes lack of knowledge transfer and interoperability “when attackers are becoming
more organized and attack methods (and modes) are evolving very fast” (Cybersecurity
of Connected Vehicles 2016, p. 6).
BV’s Guidelines list some existing cybersecurity standards and frameworks, including
the IEC 62443 (2016) series of standards and NIST Cyber Framework (2017), but explain
that those are generic and do not take into account the “specificities of vehicles”. The
Guidelines aim to consider these specificities and provide best practices for addressing
cybersecurity risks. The Guidelines are based on two widely used reputable norms, ISO
27001 (2013) Information Security Management standard and ISO 26262 (2011) standard
for functional safety to the automotive industry. (Cybersecurity of Connected Vehicles
2016, p. 7)
The Guidelines of BV consist of three main parts: Security Governance, Development
Cycle Objectives and Operation and Maintenance Objectives. The first part begins with
the Security Level Identification and concentrates on managing the cyber risk during the
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whole lifecycle of the vehicle. The second part specifies objectives for the design phase
of the vehicle considering the system, hardware and software aspects. The last part fo-
cuses on the specification of objectives for a released vehicle, including the Update Man-
agement, Cyber Security Intelligence and Remediation Measures. The objectives pre-
sented in each part are spread in three Security Levels (SL) defined in the first part of the
Guidelines and reflecting the gradually increasing implementation level of the security
management process. When defining the target Security Level, the organization needs to
consider the level of automation and connectivity of the vehicle, “the legal or financial
consequences of a security breach” and the “impact on the safety of individuals”. (Cyber-
security of Connected Vehicles 2016, p. 8-14)
As  an  example,  the  first  objective  presented  in  the  first  part  of  the  Guidelines  of  BV,
considers “Security criteria”. It is targeted to the manufacturers and begins with a refer-
ence to the CIA model – “The Availability, Confidentiality and/or Integrity criteria shall
be selected and defined for each relevant asset or resource that the vehicle may expose
directly or indirectly to cyber attacks”. The first objective also provides a list of example
assets,  such  as  the  driving  subsystem,  navigation  system history  or  current  destination
and the driver’s contact list. The objective proposes that this list of assets “shall be repre-
sentative of all the business, safety of privacy impacts that a failure of the embedded
systems may have”. In a similar style, the Guidelines present a list of objectives for each
main part and each Security Level. The comprehensive implementation of the objectives
enables the reduction of cyber security risks, which BV identifies as one of the main goals
for the manufacturers. (Cybersecurity of Connected Vehicles 2016, p. 14)
2.5.2 Unites States Coast Guard
In 2015, United States Coast Guard (USCG) published their “Cyber Strategy” which rec-
ognizes cybersecurity as one of the major economic and national security challenges the
United States is facing as a Nation. The growing amount of cyber threats poses risk not
only to the Maritime Transport System (MTS) and critical infrastructure, but furthermore
to the Nation’s security and economic stability. The first response to meet the growing
cybersecurity requirements is to adapt strategically and to recognize cyberspace as an
operational domain. USCG sets out three strategic priorities for the effective operation on
the cyber domain – “defending cyberspace”, “enabling operations” and “protecting infra-
structure”. These priorities are presented in the publication with respective more specific
goals and objectives. (Cyber Strategy 2015, p. 9)
In order to ensure long-term success, meeting the strategic goals on the cyber domain and
to support the previously mentioned three strategic priorities, USCG presents seven sup-
porting factors:
∂ “recognition of cyberspace as an operational domain,
∂ developing cyber guidance and defining mission space,
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∂ leveraging partnerships to build knowledge, resource capability, and an under-
standing of MTS cyber vulnerabilities,
∂ sharing of real-time information,
∂ organizing for success,
∂ building a well-trained cyber workforce and
∂ making thoughtful future cyber investments” (Cyber Strategy 2015, p. 12).
Following the Cyber Strategy, in 2017 USCG and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) published a draft version of the “Guidelines for Addressing Cyber Risks at Mari-
time Transportation Security ACT (MTSA) Regulated Facilities”, from now on referred
to as the “Guidelines”. The Guidelines were open for public commenting until the 11 th of
September, 2017 and consist of two parts. The first part, Enclosure 1, focuses on present-
ing existing regulatory requirements in Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), subchapter H, Maritime Security and how they relate to cybersecurity. The second
part, Enclosure 2, concentrates on guiding how to create an enterprise-wide cyber risk
management governance program based on the NIST Framework and NIST Special Pub-
lication 800-82 (K. Stouffer et al. 2015) on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security.
Details and specific examples of the development and implementation of a Cyber Risk
Management Program (CRMP) are provided. (Guidelines for Addressing Cyber Risks
2017, p. 1)
Enclosure 2 of the Guidelines of USCG widely exploits the concepts of the NIST Frame-
work and significant weight is put on the third subchapter of it, “Consequence Analysis,
Vulnerability Analysis, and Mitigation Prioritization”. The Guidelines provide five tables
for cyber risk evaluation:
∂ Table 1: For the evaluation of consequences, classification of events in five cate-
gories varying between “insignificant” and “catastrophic” is provided. A score
from 1 to 5 for an event is assigned. The table helps the identification of systems
for which further analysis is necessary.
∂ Table 2: Based on the score of event from the previous table, recommended as-
sessment actions are provided. The table helps the prioritization of systems “for
which a disruption would have the most severe consequences”.
∂ Table 3: For the “Connective Vector Assessment”, a set of “YES” or “NO” ques-
tions is presented. The table helps the determination of “which systems perform
or relate to … critical security and safety functions”.
∂ Table 4: For the “Cyber Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment”, a set of “YES”
or “NO” questions is presented. Systems with a consequence score of 3 or higher
from the first table and systems with a “YES” answers from the previous table
should be evaluated.
∂ Table  5: For the “Vulnerability Severity Assessment”, a questionnaire is pre-
sented. The key is to define the systems with “both an infrastructure vulnerability
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and a vector by which it could be exploited”. The questionnaire is answered for
each system with a “NO” answer from the previous table. The systems with the
highest total score are considered the most vulnerable. (Guidelines for Addressing
Cyber Risks 2017, p. 17-19)
B. Segalis and A. Rudawski point out the emphasis of the USCG Guidelines on Connec-
tive Vector Assessments which are used for the evaluation of connections between sys-
tems and “how these connections may impact or disrupt networks and connected systems”
(B. Segalis & A. Rudawski 2017). Segalis and Rudawski mention the example in the
Guidelines, according to which regulated facilities are expected to evaluate the possible
effect of low risk systems on critical systems – they “may access and compromise critical
systems in the event of a cyberattack”. (B. Segalis & A. Rudawski 2017)
2.6 Summary of the literature and industrial practices review
The literature and industrial practices review demonstrated, that different actors of the
maritime sector are currently releasing their own approaches and best practices on cyber-
security and new publications appear frequently. The industry has recognized the need of
developing common cybersecurity standardization. A risk-based approach acts as a pre-
dominant point of view, regardless of the publisher. New cybersecurity guidance follows
commonly recognized international standards such as ISO/IEC 27000 (2016) family of
standards and IEC 15408 (2008 & 2009) for IT security by ISO and IEC. IEC 62443
(2016) standard for IACS security and IEC 61508 (2010) functional safety standard for
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems provide guidance
for the OT safety and security. Commercial or partly commercial frameworks for holistic
enterprise IT management, such as the COBIT 5 (2012) and the ISF Standard of Good
Practice for Information Security 2016, which covers ISO/IEC 27002:2013, COBIT 5 and
the NIST Framework (2017), have been published.
The NIST Framework appeared as an influential benchmark for cybersecurity assess-
ment. Presenting a risk-based approach, this flexible and technology-neutral framework
complements the risk management process and cybersecurity program of the organiza-
tion. The NIST Framework is based on identifying the current and target cybersecurity
states and continuously identifying and prioritizing the cybersecurity improvement op-
portunities. The Framework also provides a comprehensive list of industry accepted
standards to guide the implementation of improvements and offers a chance to communi-
cate cybersecurity with important stakeholders.
ENISA’s analysis (2011) pointed out the ICT robustness against cyber attacks, fragmen-
tation of the sector to different levels and low cybersecurity awareness as key challenges
of the maritime sector. ENISA’s recommendations of implementing awareness raising
campaigns and developing a common strategy and best practices by adding the cyberse-
curity aspect to the physical safety and security policies of the maritime industry predicted
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the common trend – the holistic risk-based approach with proactive cyber and information
security risk management practices. ENISA highlighted the importance of information
sharing between different actors and the harmonization and aligning of policies. IMO’s
Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management (2017), which adapt the NIST Frame-
work with the current and target cybersecurity profiles, can be thought of as a response
to ENISA’s analysis. IMO’s Guidelines introduced five functional elements for effective
and continuous cyber risk management: Identify – Protect – Detect – Respond – Recover.
Further on and aligned with IMO’s Guidelines and the NIST Framework, BIMCO pub-
lished more comprehensive and detailed Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships
(2017). In the heart of BIMCO’s approach, there are six core concepts of effective cyber
risk management: identification of threats and vulnerabilities, assessing risk exposure,
developing protection and detection measures, establishing contingency plans and re-
sponding to and recovering from cybersecurity incident.
Code of Practice – Cyber Security for Ships (H. Boyes & R. Isbell 2017) published by
the Government of the UK was explored as an example of a state-level response to the
topic of maritime cybersecurity. The Code provides a comprehensive information pack-
age beginning from the definition of cybersecurity, to the management framework for
reducing the cyber risk. The Code also represents a risk-based approach through its con-
cepts of cyber security assessment and cyber security plan based on the ship security
assessment and ship security plan, but differently from previously presented publications,
does not refer to the NIST Framework at any point. The Code, however, provides a de-
scription of cybersecurity responsible individuals and recommends organizations to es-
tablish a security operations center as well as to belong to a cybersecurity information
sharing scheme such as CiSP.
Classification societies are complementing their rules by publishing recommended prac-
tice guidance. LR’s approach for a cyber-enabled vessel’s safety and security assurance
(Cyber-enabled Ships – Deploying Information and Communications Technology in
Shipping 2016) identifies six key areas of risk: system, human-system, software, network
and communications, data assurance and cybersecurity. LR recommends a risk-based ap-
proach such as the NIST Framework or LR’s own ARBD process to be used, as well as a
structured human-based approach ISO 9241-210 (2010). This eases the consideration of
human-system issues arising from the use of ICT instead of seafarers. LR’s approach also
highlights the increasing importance of SW maintenance because of the SW integration
and complete network and communication safety and security when the overall system
consists of multiple systems. To implement this, good engineering processes and compli-
ance with IEC 61508 (2010) are needed. LR describes cybersecurity as a through life-
issue requiring effective education and strong organizational culture, without forgetting
the industry specific factors such as Inmarsat connections and remote connectivity mak-
ing the marine environment unique for cyber incidents.
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DNV GL’s Recommended Practice (2016) makes a reference to IMO’s and BIMCO’s
guidelines as well as to the NIST Framework and introduces three factors for improving
cybersecurity: assessment, improvement, verification and validation. According to DNV
GL, coordination to quality management can be done and for example the PDCA cycle is
mentioned. DNV GL divides their approach to high-level, focused and comprehensive,
in-depth assessment which can be used for different purposes. DNV GL’s approach aims
at rating of assets regarding their cybersecurity risk and comparing current and target
safeguards and uses tools such as risk matrices, bow-tie method and CIA model in order
to achieve this. The importance of cost benefit analysis is noted when choosing improve-
ment opportunities. Focus is also given to the importance of the human factor – “desired
behaviour and awareness … needs to be evaluated just like any other objective”. For the
verification and validation, proper system and component testing is encouraged, as well
as third party testing and certification to add value.
ABS has launched the industry’s first cyber risk management program, CyberSafety™
series (2016). The four key cyber areas identified by ABS are cybersecurity, automated
systems safety, data management and SW assurance. The offering of ABS’s program is
the Capability model, which consists of the Basic, Developed and Integrated Capability
sets. These 37 capabilities are primary, measurable elements for the implementation of a
cybersecurity program. The program links system engineering and cybersecurity and of-
fers a CS Class Notation and requirements to reach each Class level, connected to the
different Capability sets and a list of reference standards. The higher implementation of
the capabilities, the higher CS Notation level can be achieved. An organization complying
with the requirements may receive certification with Notation (CS1, CS2 or CS3) for the
examined facility. The certification indicates the organization’s level of preparedness for
cybersecurity concerns and its cybersecurity maturity.
BV’s Cybersecurity of Connected Vehicles Guidelines (2016) is produced for the actors
of the automotive industry, but was inspected to compare the best practices of the mari-
time and automotive industries. BV offers a similar approach with reference to the NIST
Framework and common, previously listed IEC standards, highlighting the embedding of
new features exposed to cyber attacks and the lack of common public cybersecurity stand-
ardization for vehicles as key challenges. BV’s guidelines divide the lifecycle long cyber
risk management to three parts: Security Governance, Development Cycle Objectives and
Operation and Maintenance Objectives. The guidelines also offer a Security Level cate-
gorization for objectives presented in each part, describing the cybersecurity maturity
level similarly to ABS’s approach.
USCG’s Cyber Strategy (2015) focuses on adapting strategically and recognizing cyber
space as an operational domain, with three priorities: “defending cyber space”, “enabling
operations” and “protecting infrastructure”. Following the Cyber Strategy, USCG pub-
lished Guidelines for Addressing Cyber Risks at Maritime Transportation Security ACT
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(MTSA) Regulated Facilities (2017) together with the DHS. This publication offers guid-
ance on creating and enterprise-wide cyber risk management governance program based
on the NIST Framework and NIST SP 800-82 (K. Stouffer et al 2015). The guidelines put
emphasis on consequence and vulnerability analysis and mitigation prioritization and of-
fers tables with sets of questions and a rating method to complete this. The guidelines
additionally put weight on the evaluation of the connections between systems to revel the
possible effects of low risk systems to critical systems.
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3. AN APPROACH TO UNIFIED CYBERSECURITY
PROCESS
This section represents the empirical and practical areas of the research. In this section,
the research questions raised in the first part of this thesis are answered. The goal is to
improve and unify the cybersecurity project execution process and procedures of ABB
Marine. In order to achieve this, it was mandatory to investigate the current state of the
cybersecurity project execution process in different locations to find out any best practices
to share without an excessive demand of resources within various local business units.
Discussions with multiple experts were organized for the validation of the findings. First,
methodology for the process unification is provided for other companies to reptile and
adapt, followed by the description of the cybersecurity workshops the writer attended and
the analysis of customer needs and expectations. After this, the improvement areas and
suggestions for improvement for ABB Marine’s cybersecurity requirements and project
execution process are identified based on the previous literature and industrial practices
review section and the outcome of the workshops. Finally, based on the previous steps,
the key areas of focus for the unification of ABB Marine’s cybersecurity project execu-
tion process are presented. The work presented in this section was completed from the
perspective of a project.
3.1 Methodology for the unified process
The key for implementing a global cybersecurity project execution process unification is
information gathering, analyzing and sharing between different local business units. Since
the current cybersecurity project execution process of ABB Marine varies between dif-
ferent local business units and in some areas, may be undefined, it adds challenge to the
task. In this thesis, the state of the current cybersecurity project execution process and
best practices of different locations were investigated through workshops. The used
agenda for the workshops can be defined by the implementing actor in question depend-
ing on what the topic and goal of the investigation is. The original agenda used for the
workshops in this thesis can be found in the following chapter “3.2 Workshops”.
Figure 5 models the process aiming at the global unification of the cybersecurity project
execution process of this thesis and is now described. Since the unification process is
extensive, it cannot be completed by a sequence of actions but requires a process of con-
tinuous improvement and prioritization of items. The unification begins from a global
level decision by the cybersecurity organization of the company – the need for global
process unification needs to be identified. After this, the company needs to decide which
local business unit (LBU) is in charge of the implementation of the unification, in this
case ABB Marine Finland (LBU FI). Further decisions of the use of resources is required
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when finding the person(s) to complete the task. In this example, a master’s thesis worker
was hired to the position.
Figure 5: The overall process of global process unification
In Figure 5, the first processes are followed by the creation of a work plan, which in this
example aims at information gathering through literature research and practical work at
the company in the form of workshops with employees of different local business units.
The  workshops  are  presented  in  detail  in  the  following  chapter  of  this  thesis  and  they
represent different locations. After the first workshop (WS1), its outcome is analyzed at
LBU FI and additions to the original agenda are made respectively. This way, in the sec-
ond  workshop  (WS2),  also  the  findings  of  the  WS1  are  analyzed.  After  the  WS2,  the
information builds up through another analysis and additions at LBU FI. Finally, in the
third workshop (WS3), not only the original agenda but the items raised in the previous
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workshops and LBU FI analysis are processed and additional information value is gained.
The number of the workshops may vary under different circumstances – it may be higher
for example,  but in this study, three workshops were desired as a starting point and to
enable comprehensive analysis.
By summarizing all the gathered information and identifying the improvement areas with
respective suggestions for improvement, decisions can be made: is the item considered as
key area of focus or not? Cost benefit analysis and views of experts are supporting the
decision making and prioritizing. If the item is not considered as key area of focus, it is
stored for later utilization. The selected key areas of focus are then communicated to the
global level. After this, the implementation of respective improvement processes requir-
ing global cooperation can be started and finally, the very first decision can be reconsid-
ered: is there still a need for global process unification? This leads to a continuous im-
provement cycle and storage of suggestions for improvement of lower priority, which can
be at any time exploited.
3.2 Workshops
The first two-day workshop was organized by a product specialist of ABB Marine & Ports
at ABB headquarter in Norway. This business unit’s cybersecurity project execution pro-
cess was chosen as the first one to investigate because it was commonly considered al-
ready well developed. The material collected from this workshop could this way serve as
a base on which to build new best practices to share.
The topics discussed at the workshop in Norway included
∂ the cybersecurity team and respective roles,
∂ information sharing platform,
∂ cybersecurity process and project execution,
∂ technical solutions used for cybersecurity execution,
∂ cybersecurity standard documentation (internal and project delivery),
∂ quality control and follow up process and
∂ future plans, challenges and open questions of the Norway local business unit.
It was learnt, that although the business unit of Norway has its cybersecurity team, the
roles of the members are not very official or standardized. For example, before the work-
shop, a clear diagram representing the flow of information and reporting between differ-
ent departments and cybersecurity responsible persons did not exist.  Also,  some of the
cybersecurity responsible persons may not be fully aware of their role, since it is con-
trolled from the higher level, that they fulfill their responsibilities. However, the proce-
dure exists and is ongoing – each project has its own named cybersecurity responsible
person, a system engineer, reporting to “an integrator” that is following up and coordi-
nating the cybersecurity execution of all the projects.
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The business unit of Norway uses a Microsoft Sharepoint site as a platform to share in-
formation, procedures and news and to receive feedback from system users. Also, the
follow up of the cybersecurity project execution process and an open task list are located
at the Sharepoint site. The information sharing and especially feedback were seen as vital
factors for effective cybersecurity execution – often improvements begin to happen based
on the received feedback. What was discovered to improve the cybersecurity project ex-
ecution process as well, was the standardization of documentation. Once different cyber-
security related documents, such as handover checklists and cybersecurity information
document (including e.g. system IP addresses and SW and HW information), are made
officially part of the project document delivery, they have to be and also are completed.
When discussing the documentation, it was found out, that currently the cybersecurity
testing is included in the system testing. It was considered, that the cybersecurity testing
procedure should be standardized and a separate document should be generated to reflect
it.
Other topics discussed at the workshop in Norway included the use of SW tools. Although
they can be thought as to represent the technical details of cybersecurity and this way to
be out of the scope of this thesis, it was discovered that they are a notable factor when
improving cybersecurity. Effective use of SW tools can reduce engineering hours (for
example during system configuration) dramatically by automating previously manually
completed tasks. This way, the use of tools also reduces the risk of human error which is
a significant cause of cyber incidents. The creation, testing and sharing of SW tools be-
tween different local business units should be given attention when making plans for cy-
bersecurity improvements.
The human factor was discussed as an important topic of cybersecurity at the workshop
in Norway. Different ways of raising cybersecurity awareness among employees and im-
proving the current training methods were thought of. A common infrastructure and spe-
cific expert workshops were considered necessary. The technical knowledge, competence
and procedures of ABB Marine were not seen as a major concern regarding cybersecurity
– the key for improving and unifying the cybersecurity project execution process is in
people’s actions and harmonizing the ways to work in different locations.
The second workshop was implemented as a telephone conference with the technical
product manager for cyber security services of ABB’s Industrial Automation division,
Control Technologies business unit, located in the Netherlands. The agenda and outcome
of the workshop in Norway were used as a structure for the workshop, but the aim was to
freely exchange ideas and get input from another business unit closely working together
with ABB Marine. The cybersecurity role and responsibility division was discussed in
the beginning of the workshop and it was assessed, if the cybersecurity responsible person
of a project specifically needs to be a system engineer in the same way as at ABB Marine
Norway. A possibility of a lead engineer taking responsibility of cybersecurity execution
was seen as opportunity, depending on the competence of the person. The lead engineer
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most likely could coordinate and assign the cybersecurity related tasks of the project with-
out major difficulties. The interlocutor considered naming a cybersecurity responsible
person for each project something potentially useful.
Another possible suggestion to improve the role definition that stood up during the second
workshop could be nominating a common cybersecurity contact person for a local busi-
ness unit answering both project related and internal questions. This has previously been
done, but some problems occurred since it was an additional role for the contact person.
The contact person had to complete the cybersecurity contact person tasks in addition to
their regular work. Also, when solving project related issues, the cost allocation was sim-
ple, but when answering internal questions the contact person had to consult the manage-
ment how much time can be used and holding the role became trickier. If something sim-
ilar was desired in the future, it would be beneficial if the cybersecurity contact person
was a full time employee in order to simplify the cost allocation and to enable full capacity
for the problem solving. Basically, the division of cybersecurity roles and responsibilities
highly depends on the available personnel and resources of the local business unit in ques-
tion.
When discussing solutions for the cybersecurity follow up and maintenance during the
project, the concept of the Sharepoint site of ABB Marine Norway was introduced to the
interlocutor. The interlocutor shared their experience with the use of something similar,
but explained problems related to that. A database for reporting issues and sharing infor-
mation used to exist, but the use of it has slowly died. The interlocutor explained, that
often, when new tools such as the previous database or the Sharepoint site are introduced
to employees, the enthusiasm for using those lasts for a few months but the employees
tend to not fully commit to it and the utilization slowly ends. The interlocutor also brought
up, that in order to implement successful follow up, or more generally create alive and
well working databases, it must be ensured that the employees are aware of how to cor-
rectly utilize them and it is important to get the users fully committed to the usage.
Also, in the second workshop the importance of standardizing the cybersecurity related
project documentation was discussed. The writer of this thesis and the interlocutor agreed
that the documents produced should be as simple and unambiguous as possible. Often, an
expert becomes blind to themselves – when writing a document of a task they completed
for example, they may not succeed in delivering text equally understandable for everyone
regardless of their field of expertise. There is another problem related to the documenta-
tion, too. Unfortunately, many engineers do not necessarily enjoy writing documents.
They may have even chosen their profession based on the presumably small amount of
required writing. This sometimes becomes an issue, when the employee cannot, does not
want to, or is not interested in producing good, valid text for others to read. For example,
it would be very important to document details of system installations that require ful-
filling specific customer requirements, but this has sometimes been failed to deliver. In
order to succeed in the standardization of documentation, it is important to first design
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good documents and then ensure that everyone delivering them understands them the
same way and is able to fill the document accordingly.
The third workshop was implemented as a telephone conference with two cybersecurity
responsible persons from the marine services focused local business unit of ABB Marine
located in Italy. The previously introduced agenda and outcomes of the first two work-
shops were used as a base for the conversation. In the beginning of the workshop, the
cybersecurity role and responsibility definition was discussed. In Italy, naming of specific
cybersecurity responsible persons for projects is not completed. The business unit has one
cybersecurity responsible person for the whole unit. Due to the smaller size of this unit,
a strict role hierarchy is not seen necessary and the cybersecurity related information
sharing is done by discussions. There are a lot of different positions filled by few people
so flexible operation is required. In Italy, some organizational changes related to cyber-
security roles have been run and the definition of responsibilities is not very official or
standardized.
The cybersecurity execution follow up and maintenance of Italy does not involve any
platform such as the Sharepoint site of Norway. There is no central database for storing
and sharing cybersecurity related information and the follow up consists of the delivery
of required documents to the project leader, which means that the level of individual re-
sponsibility of completing required tasks is high. While discussing the documentation
more generally, the interlocutors agreed with other locations that standardization of some
sort would be beneficial. Also, the generation of wider documents including all the nec-
essary cybersecurity related information was favored instead of having multiple different
separate documents containing the same information. The perspective of the customer
was  also  brought  up:  one  of  the  interlocutors  expressed  that  most  likely  the  customer
would like to see a single, informative document including all the necessary items rather
than multiple different ones.
When discussing technical solutions for cybersecurity execution, the use of password
management tools was focused on. It was discovered that multiple different external fac-
tors from global politics to the customer’s opinion affect the choice of password manage-
ment tool. In theory, the decisions on how to store passwords are made by ABB, but the
customer owns the whole vessel and its systems and has the authority to choose how to
proceed with password management. This may lead to complex situations in case the
customer is responsible for managing all the passwords and this way has the authority to
make changes to the systems – how can the warranty team of ABB Marine find out the
root cause of any appearing problems, if the customer may have independently imple-
mented any modifications out of the awareness of ABB Marine? The responsibilities
should be clearly defined in order to ensure safety. The process of deciding on the pass-
word management tool in Italy is ongoing and ideally, each ABB Marine location could
follow the same procedure or at least be aware of how to access any passwords in any
situation.
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During the third workshop, cybersecurity testing in wider scope was discussed. Current
cybersecurity testing included in system testing mainly consists of double checking the
configurations. In the future, for example wider use of penetration tests may be required
by customers. Some of cybersecurity related items can be tested as part of system testing,
but when considering cybersecurity on a larger scale, experts and a specific environment
will be needed. ABB Marine has started the development of such environment. Other
topic for the future development that was brought up was the importance of clarifying the
company processes and defining the cybersecurity roles of different organization levels.
Also, the human factor was highlighted – the attitude towards cybersecurity needs to get
improved and it is a major challenge. Potentially, by demonstrating a clear way of earning
value by cybersecurity, more positive attitudes towards it could be achieved.
3.3 Analysis of customer needs and expectations through pro-
ject organization
Based on discussions with multiple members of ABB Marine project organization from
different levels, the customer needs and expectations were analyzed. The topic was also
discussed with the technical product manager for cyber security services of ABB Control
Technologies business unit. A common opinion is, that the maritime industry is slowly
increasing its cybersecurity awareness and execution levels and preparedness for cyber
attacks. Cybersecurity is on customers’ top agenda, but as in the whole process control
industry, the development is relatively slow. Previously, cybersecurity execution and re-
lated solutions were considered rather fancy and not so closely relative to the industry.
Also, the fact that vessels are physically moving and previously technically isolated from
external sources may have had an influence on the slightly slower development of cyber-
security procedures and solutions – it has been seen at the same time as a challenge and
not especially important. For example the oil and gas industry, partly because of its more
stationary characteristics, is far ahead in its cybersecurity execution and solutions com-
pared to the maritime industry. Now, the attitudes of the maritime industry have started
to change and the customers are requiring effective cybersecurity execution – and this
requires adjustments from ABB Marine & Ports as well. Also, some actors such as the
classification society DNV GL have already announced, that during 2018 its newly re-
leased cybersecurity recommendations will change into rules.
A question and challenge ABB Marine is facing is how to provide cybersecurity improv-
ing service, such as SW updates after the delivery of the vessel and get the customer
committed to it? Remote access platform offers a solution to this and the customers gen-
erally favor the idea, but they also want to feel safe. Remote access is still seen as a nota-
ble threat since it may be the only point of access from the vessel to the internet and this
way presents a major vulnerability. Also, not all the customers are fully comfortable with
the technology nor willing to pay for it  yet.  The customer often does not want anyone
from the outside of the vessel to access their system or make any modifications to setups.
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An important factor when convincing the customer of remote diagnostic services is to
highlight the fact that ABB Marine remote diagnostic system is a read-only system and
to get the customer to see that the data they are sharing is used exclusively for their ben-
efit.
Also the fact, that cybersecurity solutions can be thought as an insurance make the con-
vincing of the customer even more challenging. When compared to for example an in-
dustry solution that forecasts and optimizes production of some sort, it is way more ef-
fortless to prove the effectiveness of the solution when solid statistics of the results of
using the solution exist. A cybersecurity solution on the other hand is something the cus-
tomer invests in and pays for – and potentially never sees the effect in a similar, measur-
able way as for example a certain percentage of energy savings. The value that the cyber-
security adds should be more clearly demonstrated to the customers. The convincing
should base on real experience sharing – not theoretical papers nor marketing material.
Also, if classification societies placed direct requirements for new solutions it would fa-
cilitate the customer assurance to show compliance with these requirements. This is
something to be prepared for in the future. There are no common cybersecurity rules to
show compliance with and refer to, yet. Currently, how the customer reacts to new solu-
tions highly depends on the personality being faced.
Another factor affecting the customer’s attitude towards remote services is what the ves-
sel is loaded with – is it transporting cargo only or are there large amount of people, such
as cruise ship customers onboard? In case of cruise ships, the risk of harming or losing
life is greater and such risks are often considered extremely critical. However, the slow
change in attitudes towards positive can be seen and ABB Marine has already managed
to make update service contracts. Generally, the customers of newbuilding projects are
more interested in the new solutions since these systems are easier to build from scratch.
The customers tend to be rather reactive, not proactive, what it comes to updating of sys-
tems and adapting new solutions. When nothing is broken, it is not seen important to
consider updates or new solutions. A significant amount of vessels still run computers
with old operating system versions. Updating computers and an already existing infra-
structure can be difficult, laborious and costly. Another challenge faced when convincing
customers of new solutions is connected to ethics – in the most radical case, the potential
new, advanced solutions may lead to loss of jobs and this is an issue the customer needs
to consider. Nevertheless, ABB Marine needs to continue preparing for the growth in
demand of remote SW updates and other cybersecurity improving services and offer so-
lutions to fulfill this demand.
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3.4 Cybersecurity project execution process improvement area
detection
In this chapter, improvement areas found in ABB Marine’s cybersecurity requirements
and cybersecurity project execution process are identified based on the previous literature
and industrial practices review section and the outcome of the workshops. ABB Marine
has a formal cybersecurity organization, which has the mandate and authority to enforce
the company’s cybersecurity requirements for products, project deployment and service,
as well as for the company’s suppliers. ABB addresses cybersecurity throughout the en-
tire lifecycle, beginning from the design of the product, including all the phases through
commissioning until the maintenance, review and upgrade of the product. For example,
the “ABB Cyber Security Requirements for Suppliers” (2017c) presents requirements for
suppliers from 12 areas: secure development lifecycle, security quality, backdoor ac-
counts and hardcoded credentials, cryptographic tools and security functionalities, pro-
tection from malware propagation, handling of digital certificates, product documenta-
tion, vulnerability handling, patch management, software integrity and authenticity, data
collection, and sub-suppliers and sub-contractors. In a similar way, ABB Marine sets re-
quirements for its products, projects and services.
During the investigation and comparison of the findings of the literature and industrial
practices review, outcome of the workshops and ABB Marine’s cybersecurity require-
ments for projects, following improvement areas were detected:
∂ Inadequate global infrastructure and standardized cybersecurity project execution
process for different local business units: different business units have created
their own processes.
∂ Inadequate standardized cybersecurity related documentation: different local
business units are producing documentation with the same contents, but different
forms.
∂ Unclear definition of cybersecurity roles and responsibilities: the traceability
chain is incomplete and especially the reporting may not proceed to the top level.
∂ Conflicts between global and local cybersecurity guidelines: for some products,
contradictory guidance from different levels is provided.
∂ Information sharing and collection of feedback, also from the customer, is insuf-
ficient.
∂ The lack of separate, standardized cybersecurity testing procedure: currently, the
cybersecurity testing is included in system testing.
∂ Awareness  and  attitudes:  tasks  tend  to  be  completed  with  precision  only  when
they are standardized and officially required.
∂ Training:  not  seen  as  a  major  concern,  but  room for  improvement  still  exists  –
training is not globally valid.
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∂ Technical solutions and procedures for cybersecurity execution: solutions are not
produced, tested and shared in a coordinated manner; inadequate global lifecycle
management.
3.5 Key areas of focus for the unification of cybersecurity pro-
cess
In this chapter, potential solutions and suggestions for improvement of the previously
identified cybersecurity project execution process improvement areas are presented. Out
of these, the key areas of focus for ABB Marine from which to begin the unification of
cybersecurity execution and maintenance process for projects are identified. One of the
goals of this thesis was to assess the topic comprehensively – without seeing the big pic-
ture first, important factors may have been missed during decision making and focus
might have been put on less necessary areas. This is why the research aimed at the defi-
nition of the key areas. The process unification can be launched effectively, when the
most critical areas are first commonly identified.
Table 3 presents the detected improvement areas and the suggestions for improvements
in compressed form. In the next paragraph, the contents of the table are discussed in more
detail.
Improvement area Suggestion for improvement
Inadequate global infrastructure and
standardized cybersecurity project execu-
tion process
Enhancing of a common global level
Sharepoint site
Inadequate standardized cybersecurity re-
lated documentation
Converting unofficial documents to stand-
ardized ones with ABB document num-
bers
Unclear definition of cybersecurity roles
and responsibilities
Naming a cybersecurity responsible per-
son in each project, clarifying the infor-
mation flow between different actors
Conflicts between global and local cyber-
security guidelines
Clarifying the priority: global guidelines
must be followed; locally additional
measures can be taken, but the responsi-
bility of those and the maintenance moves
to the local level
Insufficient information sharing and feed-
back collection
Sharing information and collecting feed-
back through the Sharepoint site
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Lack of separate, standardized cybersecu-
rity testing procedure
Contacting ABB testing center in order to
begin the establishment of a standardized
cybersecurity testing procedure
Awareness and attitudes
Training
Organizing expert workshops and “tech-
nical lunch” sessions
Developing globally valid training, im-
proving web training by adding video ma-
terial
Technical solutions and procedures for cy-
bersecurity execution
Standardizing on one global password
management tool; establishing a standard-
ized production, testing and sharing pro-
cedure for cybersecurity improving tech-
nical solutions; improving backup storage
to complement global lifecycle manage-
ment
Table 3: Identified cybersecurity project execution process improvement areas and sug-
gestions for improvement
A large part of the identified improvement areas relate to inadequate standardization and
problems with information sharing. The Sharepoint site created at the business unit of
Norway could be expanded to global level use. This would be relatively painless to im-
plement and it would be a solid starting point for the development of a common infra-
structure. The Sharepoint site would be the main channel for cybersecurity related infor-
mation sharing between local business units – also feedback from projects could be col-
lected and announcements made through this channel. Open task and follow up lists could
be maintained, the cybersecurity project execution process (or a few alternatives for dif-
ferent project types) could be described and the cybersecurity related project documents
could be stored at the Sharepoint site. The continuous follow up of cybersecurity related
activities during all the phases of the project is seen as a specific area of development.
Currently, the cybersecurity handover audit before the warranty phase is subject to a lot
of pressure. More continuous follow up, such as milestone based approach, stored at the
Sharepoint site for example might improve the situation. The challenge in the implemen-
tation of a global Sharepoint site is to get employees committed to using it.
The Sharepoint site would increase the traceability of actions also by making the cyber-
security responsible persons more visible. The roles of these persons, the information
flow and responsibilities should be clarified. In Norway, a procedure for this exists and a
similar idea could be applied to ABB Marine Finland. In this case, the resources need to
be carefully considered. In Norway, the cybersecurity responsible person of a project is
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invariably a system engineer. In Finland, other options can be considered – the same re-
sponsibility could be undertaken by the lead engineer of a project, for example. Also, in
Norway, these cybersecurity responsible system engineers report to one higher level “in-
tegrator”, which takes care of the follow up and reports to the higher, global level. It is
still unknown, if the business unit of Finland would be able to name a similar type of an
integrator, but investigations on this have been started. Another open question also is,
whether the global level reporting is fully utilized or not. To be effective, the reporting
should continue without any bottlenecks in order to ensure that the information can actu-
ally be used.
In the documentation, creation and use of unofficial documents should be avoided. It has
been found, that once the document is official, it has been appointed an ABB document
number and it is part of the project document delivery set it is often more carefully filled
out. This way, there is no question nor choice – the document needs to be created and its
contents need to properly be fulfilled. Currently, different local business units are pro-
ducing documents with similar contents but in different forms. For example, some units
prefer documents with more contents while the others divide these same contents in mul-
tiple different documents. It would be beneficial, if a standardized way was followed in
different units.
Some conflicts between global and local level guidelines exist. Their priorities should be
clarified. For a global product, global guidelines should at all times be followed. In some
cases, more detailed or strict local guidelines and measures have been established. These
can be practiced, but it should be clear, that the responsibility of the measure in question
moves to the local level. For example, use of managed network switches is not always
necessary, but in case these are chosen to be used, the local team is in charge of them.
The conflicts between global and local guidance should be broken down and the influence
of local units to the cybersecurity requirements of global products should be clarified and
communicated to local teams.
Currently, cybersecurity testing is included in the system testing. A need of a separate,
standardized cybersecurity testing procedure has been identified. During this thesis, the
preparation and building of a cybersecurity laboratory was started. In order to begin the
development of the testing procedure, the ABB testing center should be contacted. Also,
the production, testing and sharing of technical solutions such as SW tools for cyberse-
curity execution is insufficient. A standardized procedure for this should be developed.
The software team should be contacted to begin the process. It was also discovered, that
different locations use different password management tools. The reason for this should
be further investigated and the use of a common, globally used password management
tool should be pursued.
There is no single globally effective method for improving cybersecurity related aware-
ness, attitudes and training, but the need for expert workshops was identified. Expert
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workshops would offer a chance for more effective information sharing than simple cy-
bersecurity status meetings that currently exist. However, the organization of expert
workshops is quite resource-consuming so only limited possibilities for them exist. Ex-
isting web training could be updated for example to include video material in order to
make the training more attractive to the employees. Another method for improving aware-
ness, attitudes and training could be a “technical lunch” session. During these sessions,
an employee from certain area of expertise delivers a presentation of a desired topic while
the audience members enjoy their lunch. These sessions would be organized during the
lunch break to lower the participation threshold and invitations would be sent to every
employee that the subject may touch. Technical lunch sessions have already been proven
effective in Norway so this may be something to consider in Finland as well.
It was also discovered, that different locations have slightly different cybersecurity train-
ing requirements for their employees working in projects. Generally, the same collection
of web courses needs to be taken, but in Finland, an additional “hands-on” session is
required for everyone working close to the systems of a vessel. In theory, this leads to the
situation where for example a project engineer from Norway would not be qualified to
work  in  projects  of  Finnish  ownership.  To  increase  the  flexibility  of  using  employees
from different business units globally, the training should be standardized – a reasonably
resource efficient solution would be adding the hands-on session as a part of the cyberse-
curity training in other locations as well.
3.5.1 Selecting key areas of focus for the process unification
In this chapter, the reasoning for the selection of key areas of focus for the process unifi-
cation is presented and finally, the selected key areas are listed. The whole research was
done with one important factor in mind – at ABB Marine Finland, the technical cyberse-
curity related knowledge, measures and procedures were not seen as major concern. To a
large extent in practice, cybersecurity execution can be thought to consist of access limi-
tation and isolated systems. The company believes that the technical measures and pro-
cedures for effective cybersecurity execution from this point of view exist. It would be
more important to ensure that everything else on a larger scale supports these already
existing and effective measures rather than focusing on the technical details too much.
This is why the research concentrated on the project point of view.
When selecting the key areas of focus for the process unification, ABB Marine Finland
needs to consider which issues it can truly affect, which generally mean the company’s
own actions. It may be beneficial to try influencing the customer’s actions for example in
order to make the customer interface smoother. It is also important to be aware of the
division of cybersecurity responsibilities between ABB and the customer. However, from
the perspective of this research, focus on ABB Marine Finland’s own actions was kept.
Another important factor for the selection of key areas was the cost  benefit  ratio.  Also
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purely from the cybersecurity point of view, only cost and resource efficient improve-
ments with the highest positive effect on cybersecurity should be implemented.
ABB Marine Finland will work for the improvement of all the improvement areas of
Table 3, but prioritizes the following items:
∂ Inadequate global infrastructure and standardized cybersecurity project ex-
ecution process:  The enhancing of a common global level Sharepoint site was
started in global cooperation with the local business unit of Norway’s cybersecu-
rity Sharepoint admin.
∂ Training: A goal was set, that employees from different local business units could
work in any other location’s projects by completing a common set of training.
∂ Conflicts between global and local cybersecurity guidelines: The clarification
process was started for the Remote Diagnostic System product in global coopera-
tion with the global product manager, automation infrastructure product area man-
ager and other relevant experts.
∂ Technical solutions and procedures for cybersecurity execution: The process
of deciding on a global password management tool was started. The development
of a new cybersecurity execution service solution was started in global coopera-
tion with system, cybersecurity service and other relevant experts.
The common global level Sharepoint site was considered as a good starting point and
basis for the unification process of cybersecurity project execution. Only the fact that
cybersecurity related information from all the locations is collected together and visible
for all relevant employees in a structured and coordinated way may speed up the unifica-
tion and interaction between different locations. The enhancing of the global Sharepoint
site was started as a result of the workshop in Norway and the following discussions. The
already existing cybersecurity Sharepoint site of Norway was used as a base for the new,
global one and technical documentation specialists were consulted in order to ensure the
best possible implementation. Additionally, following the workshop in Norway and this
thesis work, ABB Marine & Ports began considering its cybersecurity role and responsi-
bility division and specifically the need for naming a globally responsible person for cy-
bersecurity project deployment. This enables effective development and maintenance of
the new, global level cybersecurity Sharepoint site. The identified improvement areas can
this way be improved in global cooperation. The writer of this research continues sup-
porting the process after returning the thesis.
It was seen possible to improve cybersecurity training in a reasonably budget friendly and
little resource consuming way. The clear differences between the training requirements
of different locations can be faded by complementing the lower sets of requirements with
the  existing  higher  ones  –  in  this  case,  by  adding  the  hands-on  training  session  to  all
locations. The current hands-on training needs to be studied in order to find out the best
way to implement the same contents in different locations. The investigation was started
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as a result of this research. Additionally, cybersecurity training is a topic demanding care-
ful consideration in the future. The cybersecurity standardization process in a large scale
is running and industries are agreeing on common rules and requirements. This will even-
tually lead to the stabilization of the status of cybersecurity training similar to the existing
occupational  safety,  hot  work  and  safety  at  electrical  work  trainings  –  without  a  com-
pleted,  nationally valid course,  a person is not qualified to work in an environment re-
quiring those courses. A more formal status of this kind potentially increases the level of
cybersecurity awareness as well once the organizing of necessary training for employees
is not only in the hands of the company in question but an absolute, national requirement.
Conflicts between global and local cybersecurity guidelines must be clarified. The issue
was revealed, when the global product manager of the Remote Diagnostic System of ABB
Marine & Ports contacted the writer of this thesis and presented the feedback received
from different local teams. When addressing the issues in Finland, it was found out that
problem solving will require participation of experts from different areas. The process
started from reviewing one specific product, but soon expanded to larger scale involving
consideration of other products and the entity they form. Also, group level globalization
of security policies is currently running. The clarification process will continue in global
cooperation after returning this thesis and the writer will remain involved.
The consideration of technical solutions and procedures for cybersecurity execution
raised the question of password management tools in use. The harmonizing of the use of
password management tools was started in order to ensure successful service operations
regardless the location in question. Additionally, as a result of this thesis, the development
of a new cybersecurity improving service solution was started in global cooperation. At
the workshop in Norway, the host of the workshop expressed a need for implementing an
already existing solution for large scale systems. This has not been completed before, but
the resources for the implementation existed. Following the workshop and discussions in
Finland, the writer of this thesis contacted the global cyber security solution manager of
ABB Marine & Ports and the development process was kicked off involving the relevant
specialists. After returning this thesis, the writer continues assisting in the process.
3.5.2 Additional future suggestions
This chapter presents other observations and ideas of the writer for the future based on
the literature and industrial practices review and the practical work done for this research.
The writer sees the definition of cybersecurity roles and responsibilities inside organiza-
tions as an extremely necessary matter. These roles and responsibilities are not fully set-
tled as common standard and routine among the companies yet – although the full concept
of cybersecurity may be part of the company’s overall management, deficiencies in the
organizing of the cybersecurity responsibilities can be found. This can however be
slightly compensated by the responsibility of the individual which is essential for effec-
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tive overall cybersecurity execution and requires high level of awareness and commit-
ment. During the research, the writer found out that also the cybersecurity organization
of ABB Marine is continuously evolving. New roles will be defined which is a good
direction on the way of fulfilling all cybersecurity needs and ensuring effective, continu-
ous development of overall cybersecurity and cyber risk management. Clear definition of
roles and responsibilities also facilitates the flow of information, which often, when in-
sufficient, has been noted to cause problems.
Compliance with the newest cybersecurity best practices, frameworks and cyber pro-
grams presented in the literature and industrial practices review may be proved very im-
portant for ABB Marine when seeking competitive advantage in the future. It will be
mandatory for ABB Marine to fulfil some of the current recommendations in the near
future when they become rules, as for example DNV GL has already announced. This is
a minimum requirement – by doing more, for example when demonstrating compliance
with the new, potentially ad hoc standard NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infra-
structure Cybersecurity (2017), additional benefits can be achieved. Also the ABS Cy-
berSafety™ series (2016) attracted the writer’s interest as the maritime “industry’s first
risk-based management program”. Certification of compliance of this kind of holistic
maritime cyber risk management program is a solid proof for customers of advanced cy-
bersecurity maturity. Such certifications could potentially be a way for ABB Marine to
stand out from the competitors and attract new markets. Pioneering in the area of cyber-
security as well is necessary for ABB Marine in order to ensure growth in the future. The
company also needs to be able to demonstrate that its new, cyber-enabled solutions are
safe and add value when marketing them – they are key factors when convincing the
customer. New cybersecurity certifications offer this opportunity and may be worth fur-
ther investigation.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This thesis provides a literature and industrial practices review of the latest cybersecurity
publications of the maritime industry and in practice, presents a methodology for global
process unification and identifies the key areas of focus for ABB Marine Finland from
which to begin the unification of their cybersecurity execution and maintenance process
for projects. This chapter summarizes the findings and the results of the research, evalu-
ates them and briefly proposes topics for future research.
4.1 Key findings and results
The literature and industrial practices review demonstrated the ruling approach of the
maritime industry for cybersecurity – holistic cyber risk management through each or-
ganization level. The maritime sector has defined the need for common cybersecurity
standardization and currently actively works towards this. Different actors of the industry,
such as classification societies, are frequently publishing their cybersecurity best prac-
tices which are expected to become rules in the near future, some even during 2018. The
cybersecurity framework by NIST (2017), although currently published as draft version,
is already frequently referred to and recognized by the maritime industry. In order to gain
competitive advantage, ABB Marine has to fill all the new cybersecurity requirements
without delay. The introduction of new cybersecurity certifications, such as the ABS Cy-
berSafety™ series (2016), may increase these requirements in case they are considered
valuable and worthy of pursuit.
In addition to providing a literature study, this thesis aimed at improving the cybersecurity
execution process for projects at ABB Marine. Currently, differences between local busi-
ness units can be found. The company has recognized the need for unifying their cyber-
security execution and maintenance process for projects towards single, global level pro-
cess. Since the unification process is extensive, the goal of this thesis was to identify the
key areas for the beginning of the work. The literature and industrial practices review was
used as a theoretical framework for the empirical part consisting of workshops with cy-
bersecurity responsible persons of the company and the following analysis of this thesis.
By investigating and comparing the findings of the literature research, outcome of the
workshops and ABB Marine’s cybersecurity requirements for projects, a list of cyberse-
curity project execution process improvement areas and relative suggestions for improve-
ment was presented. All the detected improvement areas will be worked on, but ABB
Marine Finland prioritizes items from four key areas: inadequate global infrastructure and
standardized cybersecurity project execution process, training, conflicts between local
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global and local cybersecurity guidelines and technical solutions and procedures for cy-
bersecurity execution.
Following  this  thesis,  ABB  Marine  Finland  decided  to  begin  enhancing  of  a  common
global level Sharepoint site which was considered to be a solid start for the process uni-
fication. A common Sharepoint site improves information sharing, collection of feedback
and common infrastructure, when relevant cybersecurity information is visible for all lo-
cations under single platform.
Training was selected as another key area for process unification. ABB Marine Finland
set the target of standardizing the cybersecurity training to be globally valid in such way,
that employees from different local business units could work in any other location’s pro-
jects. This can be implemented by adding the contents of the business unit of Finland’s
hands-on session to the training in other locations. The investigation on the best way to
implement this and the search for potential new responsible persons for training was
started.
As a result of this thesis, a clarification process of conflicting global and local cybersecu-
rity guidelines started. The issue was revealed when reviewing the Remote Diagnostic
System product, but now involves consideration of other products, the entity they form
and participation of experts from different areas.
For the technical solutions and procedures item, ABB Marine Finland began investigating
the potential use of a global password management tool. This would ensure successful
operations in any location. Also, the development of a new cybersecurity execution ser-
vice solution was started in global cooperation following the workshop in Norway.
This  thesis  kicked  off  definition  of  new cybersecurity  roles  for  ABB Marine  & Ports.
Designation of a globally cybersecurity responsible person for project deployment is
planned. The development of standardized cybersecurity best practices was considered
so necessary that ABB Marine Finland is also considering the recruitment of a new, full
time employee for cybersecurity. In addition to the previously presented cybersecurity
development processes, the writer of this thesis will continue supporting the improvement
of cybersecurity in the company after this thesis.
4.2 Evaluation of research results
Overall, this thesis succeeded in answering the research questions, but some challenges
were faced during the process. This chapter evaluates the results of the research and their
theoretical and practical relevance.
This thesis represents new type of research for ABB Marine & Ports and more generally,
to the maritime sector. Cybersecurity is a hot topic for the whole industry and this research
aimed at collecting together the current approaches of different actors of the maritime
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sector in the literature and industrial practices review. This was successful, but due to the
scope of this thesis, the most detailed examination of the material was not carried out and
may be considered necessary in the future. New cybersecurity related publications are
also continuously being released and in order to stay up to date, the company needs to
follow release channels and investigate all the relevant, new guidelines. However, the
literature and industrial practices review provides for example the management and cy-
bersecurity responsible persons of the company with a versatile overview of the current
cybersecurity situation of the maritime industry. It may also help the preparation for fu-
ture requirements.
Practically, the participation of experts from different areas in the contribution of this
thesis adds the reliability and validity of the results. The research was done from ABB
Marine project organization’s perspective and the writer managed to cooperate with cy-
bersecurity responsible persons from different local business units. In the scope of the
research, the experts represent the project organization sufficiently and provided reliable
information. All the experts argued their views carefully which enabled comprehensive
analysis and comparison of different options. The count of the participating experts could
potentially have been higher, but in that case such thorough discussions may not have
been possible.
The fact that solving cybersecurity related issues often is an additional activity of the
experts’ job description caused some challenges in the process. Finding the time and re-
sources for the participation required careful planning, but despite the limitations even
face to face meetings were successfully organized. Realizing this, the time with experts
was well  planned and efficiently used. Although the topic of cybersecurity was widely
addressed, same issues emerged in different conversations. This validated the common
view about which items are important. The decision making and prioritization of different
items proved to be challenging, but this was managed by analyzing which items would
be relatively effortlessly realizable, cost efficient and offer immediate, tangible benefits.
The list of improvement areas and suggestions for improvement produced in this thesis
acts as such as a tool for developing the cybersecurity policies and procedures of the
company. This thesis provides practical suggestions for the cybersecurity related issues
the project organization of ABB Marine & Ports is facing but in order to ensure the suc-
cessful further development, the unification process continues under the group level glob-
alization of security policies.
4.3 Further research topics
The topic of this research is extensive and still leaves a need for future research. In order
to ensure the successful unification of cybersecurity execution and maintenance process
for projects, ABB Marine needs to study more closely at what level the unification is
possible. The special features, requirements and distinctive forms of business of different
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local business units need to be carefully considered. The unification process requires
global cooperation on all levels of the organization.
Since the literature and industrial practices review of this thesis provides an overview of
the selected sources, ABB Marine needs to decide whether some of the publications re-
quire special attention and examination in the future. Material produced by the closest
stakeholders of ABB Marine & Ports may need more detailed and systematic exploring
in order to ensure full compliance. Also, the potential value of new cybersecurity certifi-
cations, such as the ABS CyberSafety™, may need to be investigated.
The maritime industry’s future direction towards the increased amount of cyber-enabled
solutions and autonomous vessels demands ABB Marine to remain up to date with the
newest cybersecurity requirements and rules of the industry. In order to successfully bring
new products to the market, these requirements must be fulfilled and this must be demon-
strated to the classification societies, customers and other stakeholders. In the future, the
topic of cybersecurity will increase its significance in the maritime sector and when the
customers are adapting to the change of the industry, ABB Marine needs to answer these
needs promptly in order to achieve competitive advantage.
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APPENDIX A: THE ABS CYBERSAFETY™ FULL CAPABILITY
MODEL
Figure 6: The ABS CyberSafety™ Capability Model (J. Jorgensen 2016, p. 14)
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APPENDIX B: THE ABS CYBERSAFETY™ CAPABILITY MATRIX
EXAMPLE
Figure 7: Example of the ABS CyberSafety™ Capability Matrix (CyberSafety™ - Vol-
ume 2 2016, p. 38)
